Alchemical Rulemaking and Ideological Framing: Lessons from the 40-Year Battle to Regulate Mercury Emissions from Electric Power Plants by Carter, Andrew
Volume 58 
Issue 1 Winter 
Winter 2018 
Alchemical Rulemaking and Ideological Framing: Lessons from 
the 40-Year Battle to Regulate Mercury Emissions from Electric 
Power Plants 
Andrew Carter 
University of Miami 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew Carter, Alchemical Rulemaking and Ideological Framing: Lessons from the 40-Year Battle to 
Regulate Mercury Emissions from Electric Power Plants, 58 Nat. Resources J. 124 (2018). 
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol58/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more 
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu. 
 125 
Andrew Carter* 
ALCHEMICAL RULEMAKING AND 
IDEOLOGICAL FRAMING: LESSONS FROM THE 
40-YEAR BATTLE TO REGULATE MERCURY 
EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Environmental mercury has long been linked to adverse health 
impacts on human populations. Globally ubiquitous at ambient 
levels in air and water, it can reach potentially unsafe levels in 
fish as it biologically magnifies and accumulates through aquatic 
and marine food webs. Vulnerable communities, including many 
communities of color, are particularly at risk from fish-borne 
mercury. Despite the fact that coal-fired electric generating units 
have been recognized as major sources of environmental 
mercury since the 1970s, and that the Environmental Protection 
Agency discussed possible future regulations of mercury 
emissions from such plants in 1975, it was not until 2014 that the 
Obama administration promulgated the Mercury and Air Toxics 
Rule regulating such emissions – and not until 2016 that the rule 
appeared to be firmly in place after the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s revised findings promulgated in response to 
the Supreme Court’s remand in Michigan v. EPA. 
This article examines the more than forty-year-long debate over 
mercury emissions regulations from electric generating utilities, 
situating it in the context of both scientific uncertainty and the 
larger legal and ideological conflicts that have grown to define 
environmental policy discourse in the United States since the 
1970s. It focuses on the discursive tactics – the ways actors 
interpret the meaning of both laws and science, and frame those 
meanings in ways that push regulatory actions in directions that 
those actors want them to go, even when they seem to conflict 
with the plain language of the Clean Air Act. While offering a 
historically comprehensive account, it pays special attention to 
contrasting the development of the Bush-era Clean Air Mercury 
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Rule in 2005 with the far different Obama-era Mercury and Air 
Toxics Rule. The development of these two rules show how the 
same statutory language can lead to significantly different 
regulatory regimes depending on the ideological motivations of 
those in power, and environmental justice can frequently be 
abrogated in favor of commercial interests. Considering the 
Trump administration’s call for significant rollbacks in 
environmental protection laws, this article may provide insight 
into what happens to environmental statutory interpretation and 
varying strategic interpretations of scientific uncertainty. Just as 
ancient alchemists saw mercury as an element of change and 
flux, ideological actors in the modern federal rulemaking process 
have seen the rules governing mercury emission as subject to its 
own transmutation, able to flow and transform into different 
manifestations as ideological actors gain control of the 
regulatory crucible. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to industry 
petitioners seeking to invalidate the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 
rule regulating the emissions of mercury and other Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(HAPs) from coal- and oil-fired electric generating units (EGUs)1 under Section 
112 of the Clean Air Act (CAA).2 That ruling appears—at least currently3—to 
signal the end of a forty-year debate over EPA regulation of EGU-sourced 
mercury, a conflict that intensified after a 2000 rule promulgated by the Clinton 
administration regulating EGU-sourced HAPs, and escalated over the next sixteen 
years as successive administrations attempted to implement mercury regulations 
that reflected dramatically different environmental ideologies.4 The latest ruling 
 
 1. Michigan v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 2463 (2016) (mem). Industry petitioners sought to overturn the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in White Stallion Energy Center, L.L.C. v. EPA, where the court remanded the 
rule to EPA rather than vacate it. White Stallion Energy Ctr., L.L.C. v. EPA, No. 12-1100, 2015 WL 
11051103, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2015) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 136 S. 
Ct. 2463 (2016) (mem). 
 2. Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012). 
 3. The recent election of Donald Trump, who has taken office with Republican majorities in both 
the House and Senate, and who has called for significant rollbacks in environmental protection laws, 
renders the issue slightly more uncertain than it appeared prior to November 8, 2016. As will be 
described in further detail in this article, the current regulations are currently codified, and any changes 
would have to be implemented through either a new rulemaking process or changes to the Clean Air Act 
itself. Should the mercury emissions limitations discussed become a target of new rulemaking, this 
article becomes not just a work of environmental legal history but a possible blueprint to how those 
attacks may be carried out. 
 4. As will be discussed in more detail below, the rulemaking history concerning EGU-sourced 
mercury and other HAPs is convoluted: EPA initially promulgated a rule regulating such emissions from 
EGUs in 2000 during the Clinton administration, attempted to reverse that decision in 2005 during the 
Bush administration, re-”confirmed” the 2000 rule in 2012 during the Obama administration after the 
D.C. Circuit Court invalidated the attempted 2005 revision, but then had to revise the original 2000 
listing decision after the Supreme Court held it had impermissibly fail to account for costs. Regulatory 
Finding on the Emissions of HAPs from EGUs, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825 (Dec. 20, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 
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comes almost a year after the Supreme Court invalidated the same rule on the 
grounds that it impermissibly failed to incorporate costs into the decision to 
regulate EGUs under Section 112, leading the D.C. Circuit Court to remand the 
Obama administration’s attempt to put into effect stringent HAP emissions 
restrictions opposed by the EGU industry, in Michigan v. EPA.5 
Until recently, the decades-long debate over whether EGU-sourced 
mercury should be regulated under the HAP provisions of the CAA has been 
consistently resolved in favor of the EGU industry and a “wait and see” approach 
that used scientific uncertainty as a rationale to avoid regulations the energy 
industry sees as financially undesirable, even as evidence has increasingly shown 
that environmental mercury may pose a risk to a significant number of Americans, 
particularly children and the unborn.6 
Mercury is a toxic contaminant that has long been linked to adverse health 
impacts on humans and other organisms. Though found naturally, anthropogenic 
sources of mercury, particularly industrial emissions, have significantly increased 
environmental levels over the past two hundred years.7 While mercury is globally 
ubiquitous at ambient levels in air and water, it can reach potentially unsafe levels 
in fish as it magnifies and accumulates through aquatic and marine food webs, 
threatening the health of human populations that consume seafood in significant 
quantities.8 Over the past several decades, increased understanding of the mercury 
cycle and the potential health impacts of environmental mercury has led to legal 
and regulatory mechanisms both domestically and abroad intended to mitigate such 
health risks.9 However, such regulations are complicated not only by significant 
 
Listing Rule]; Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of HAPs From EGUs 
and the Removal of Coal- and Oil-Fired EGUs From the Section 112(c) List, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 
29, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Delisting Rule] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 40, 63) (“We are taking this 
action because we now believe that the December 2000 finding lacked foundation and because recent 
information demonstrates that it is not appropriate or necessary to regulate [EGUs] under section 112.”); 
Nat’l Emission Standards for HAPs From Coal- and Oil-Fired EGUs and Standards of Performance for 
Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-
Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9335 (Feb. 16, 2012) [hereinafter 
2012 Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, or 2012 MATS Rule] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63) 
(“New technical analyses conducted by EPA confirm that it remains appropriate and necessary to 
regulate HAP emissions from EGUs.”); Supplemental Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to 
Regulate HAPs From Coal- and Oil-Fired EGUs, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420 (Apr. 25, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 
Supplemental Finding] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 
(2015) (invalidating and reversing the 2012 MATS Rule); New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577–78 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the 2005 Delisting Rule). Principal proposed and final rules are discussed 
herein; as with many complex rulemaking processes, numerous minor technical corrections are 
published through the Federal Register, but are not referenced unless substantively relevant to the 
discussion at hand. 
 5. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712. 
 6. Research regarding adverse health effects of mercury is discussed in Section I.A below. 
 7. See generally E.G. Pacyna et al., Global Emission of Mercury to the Atmosphere from 
Anthropogenic Sources in 2005 and Projections to 2020, 44 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 2487 (2010). 
 8. For an explanation of bioaccumulation and biomagnification processes, see Richard L. 
Williamson et al., Gathering Danger: The Urgent Need to Regulate Toxic Substances that can 
Bioaccumulate, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 605, 609–18 (1993). 
 9. A number of state and federal statutes and regulations regulate mercury from a variety of 
sources in products, food, and the environment, though a comprehensive discussion of such regulations 
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uncertainty in how mercury moves through the environment and to what extent it 
affects humans and other organisms once it has entered the body, but also by 
political and economic interests that impact the success and stringency of 
regulations.10 
One of the most significant anthropogenic sources of environmental 
mercury is the EGU sector.11 Despite growing scientific and public concerns in the 
1960s and 1970s over anthropogenic mercury in the United States, and the 
enactment of the CAA, which allowed federal regulation of airborne toxics,12 EPA 
has historically been largely unwilling to directly regulate EGU-sourced mercury. 
While EPA began regulating atmospheric mercury emissions under Section 112 
from certain other sources as early as 1973, it did not attempt to regulate EGU-
sourced mercury as a HAP until 2000, a decision which the second Bush 
 
is beyond the scope of this article. The focus here is on EGU-sourced mercury emissions regulations 
under CAA because those emissions currently make up the largest single source of anthropogenic 
mercury emissions in the United States, and because the complex regulatory history concerning them 
offers a compelling case study in the evolution of, and difficulties inherent in, the U.S. system of federal 
environmental governance. Furthermore, the federal environmental regulatory scheme is enormously 
complex, and other environmental laws and regulations can, in theory, regulate EGU-sourced mercury 
indirectly; for example, the Clean Water Act (CWA) requires states to report waterbodies containing 
certain levels of pollutants, including both mercury generally and methylmercury specifically, that may 
have been deposited from EGU emissions. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2012) (Water 
quality standards and implementation plan provision of CWA); EPA Water Quality Standards, 40 
C.F.R. pt. 131 (2016). For a general overview of mercury regulation in the United States, see U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Environmental Laws that Apply to Mercury, 
https://www.epa.gov/mercury/environmental-laws-apply-mercury (last visited Sept. 9, 2017); and see 
Wendy Thomas, Note, Through the Looking Glass: A Reflection on Current Mercury Regulation, 29 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145 (2004) (discussing Federal mercury regulations generally). Also beyond the 
scope of this article is an in-depth treatment of the Minamata Convention, a global treaty created in 2013 
to regulate mercury releases to the environment and to which the United States is a party. Minamata 
Convention, Oct. 10, 2013, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2013/10/20131010%2011-
16%20AM/CTC-XXVII-17.pdf. While Article 8 of the Minamata Convention requires the U.S. to take 
steps to reduce EGU-sourced mercury emissions, it currently stands as a sole executive agreement 
entered into under the President’s executive authority, meaning that as of now compliance with the 
Convention will be carried out through the CAA rulemaking discussed here. Such efforts could be 
abandoned by the new administration. For a discussion of legal issues relating to the domestic 
implementation of sole executive agreements, see Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive 
Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007). 
 10. For earlier accounts of EGU-sourced mercury regulation, see Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. 
Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration (pt. 1), 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10297 
(2004) [hereinafter Heinzerling & Steinzor Part I]; Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect 
Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration (pt. 2), 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10485 (2004) [hereinafter 
Heinzerling & Steinzor Part II]; David Rugh, Note, Clearer, But Still Toxic Skies: A Comparison of the 
Clear Skies Act, Congressional Bills, and the Proposed Rule to Control Mercury Emissions from Coal-
Fired Power Plants, 28 VT. L. REV. 201 (2004); James Ruhl, Note, Quicksilver Alchemy: New 
England’s Mercury Control Programs and the Clean Air Mercury Rule, 32 VT. L. REV. 525 (2008); and 
Thomas, supra note 9. 
 11. The majority of EGU mercury emissions come from coal-fired electric utility generators, 
though oil-fired generators also emit mercury in smaller amounts. Gas-powered EGUs do not emit 
mercury in any significant amount; for the purposes of this article, and consistent with EPA’s own 
definition, “EGUs” without any qualifier as to type refers to coal- and oil-fired utility units generating 
electricity for sale, typically found in electric utility installations. 
 12. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 77 Stat. 392 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401–7671q (2012)). 
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administration would attempt to retract, leading to lengthy court battles, a 
subsequent attempted re-implementation by the Obama administration in 2011, the 
Michigan decision and its aftermath. 
The historic failure to regulate EGU-sourced mercury has not been driven 
by any single factor. Legitimate scientific uncertainty complicates the issue; while 
evaluation of the health or environmental risks of air pollutants generally is rife 
with uncertainty, mercury science particularly has suffered from significant 
knowledge gaps in how it moves and cycles through the environment, as well as 
how it impacts human populations.13 However, as will be argued below, scientific 
uncertainty has often been used as a discursive weapon to delay or weaken 
regulation, and many decisions in mercury regulation specifically can be credibly 
attributed to what environmental policy theorist Wendy Wagner defines as the 
“science charade” –or regulatory agencies’ use of putatively scientific rationales (in 
this case scientific uncertainty) to avoid accountability for underlying policy 
decisions.14 
This “science charade” is driven largely by the powerful energy utility and 
coal lobbies, and pro-industry administrations generally hostile to environmental 
regulations. It is enabled by a successful multi-decadal push by anti-regulatory 
think tanks, lobbying groups, and advocacy organizations to not only normalize 
cost-benefit approaches to managing environmental health, but also do so in a way 
that maximizes industry costs and minimizes public benefits of potential regulatory 
approaches.15 These actors have crafted effective anti-regulatory, pro-capitalism 
“policy stories” that have significantly changed the regulatory landscape, 
particularly since the 1980s.16 When the more easily quantifiable costs of mercury 
 
 13. See, e.g., CHEMICALS BRANCH, UNITED NATIONS ENTL. PROGRAMME , GLOBAL MERCURY 
ASSESSMENT 2013, at 30 (2013) [hereinafter UNEP MERCURY REPORT], 
http://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/7984 (Once at the UNEP Document Repository page, 
download a PDF version of the report from either of the provided “ENGLISH” or “Show full item 
record” links); Matthew O. Gribble et al., Mercury, Selenium and Fish Oils in Marine Food Webs and 
Implications for Human Health, J. MARINE BIOLOGY ASS’N U.K. 43, 46 (2015). See generally 
Mahamud Subir et al., A Review of Uncertainties in Atmospheric Modeling of Mercury Chemistry I: 
Uncertainties in Existing Kinetic Parameters – Fundamental Limitations and the Importance of 
Heterogeneous Chemistry, 45 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 5664 (2011). 
 14. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 
1617 (1995). 
 15. See Thomas McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 51 (1998) (“[F]ree 
marketeers . . . tend to overestimate the costs and underestimate the benefits of social regulation in their 
calculations.”); Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2002) (“[A]gencies are heavily dependent upon 
the regulated entities for information about compliance costs. Knowing that the agencies are less likely 
to impose regulatory options with high price tags . . . regulatees have every incentive to err on the high 
side.”). 
 16. Sidney A. Shapiro, Talking About Regulation: Political Discourse and Regulatory Gridlock, 7 
WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 1, 6, 20–23 (2017). There is a substantial body of work on the intersection 
of politics and science in environmental policy, and the dilemmas inherent in technical rulemaking, 
particularly in areas of scientific uncertainty. E.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE 
ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990); JUDITH A. LAYZER, OPEN FOR BUSINESS: CONSERVATIVES’ 
OPPOSITION TO ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (2012); Daniel Sarewitz, What is the “Rightful Place” 
of Science?, in THE RIGHTFUL PLACE OF SCIENCE: POLITICS 91 (G. Pascal Zachary ed., 2013); Laurence 
H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1972). 
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emissions control are measured against the far more uncertain risks of those 
emissions, it is easy for opponents to justify waiting for greater scientific 
certainty.17 Furthermore, and as will be shown below, anti-regulation policymakers 
and their allies in the public and private sphere have become especially skilled at 
minimizing, weakening, and delaying regulatory measures through indirect 
approaches that use a putatively pro-environmental narrative frame while 
implementing rules that favor industry. As will also be shown below, in addition to 
capitalizing on uncertainties and ambiguities in the science, such actors have also 
capitalized on ambiguities in how the law is worded – or by creating ambiguity 
when there seems to be little. 
The criticism of letting anti-regulatory ideologies drive much of the 
rulemaking decisions discussed here is not (or at least not solely) because it tends 
to produce anti-environmental regulation, but because it leads to rulemaking 
decisions that conflict with the plain text of the law, and have so for decades. While 
this article does take a (mostly) implicit normative position in favor of 
environmental regulations more protective of humans and the environment, it also 
sets out to show that the historical decisions catalogued here are problematic from a 
democratic standpoint, independent of one’s views on environmental regulations 
specifically. Congress decided to prioritize limiting HAPs with the CAA and its 
amendments, and gave EPA certain nondiscretionary duties to do so. When it 
comes to EGU-sourced mercury, however, EPA largely failed to execute the law as 
written. 
This article traces how EGU-sourced mercury escaped regulation for so 
long under the CAA despite growing scientific and societal awareness of the 
dangers of environmental mercury, even as other anthropogenic sources of the 
element became more tightly regulated. While several articles have been published 
addressing specific regulatory debates in EGU-sourced mercury regulations,18 this 
article examines that regulatory history over the life of the CAA, situating it in the 
context of the larger ideological conflicts that grew to define the environmental 
policy discourse in the United States following the implementation of the federal 
environmental regulatory apparatus, and the various discursive strategies anti-
regulatory actors have used to prevent the regulation of mercury emissions from 
EGUs.19 
As political scientist and environmental policy analyst Judith Layzer has 
noted, “[a]n exclusive focus on overt policy debates and formal decisions can 
obscure ‘the subterranean political processes that shape ground-level policy 
effects,’ as well as the ways that powerful actors shape and restrict the political 
 
 17. See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF 
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 76–77 
(2010) (paraphrasing quote by former Council of Environmental Quality member J. Christopher 
Bernabo as “the degree of scientific certainty demanded is proportional to the cost of doing something 
about it”). 
 18. See articles cited supra note 10. 
 19. It takes, in other words, a diachronic approach. See Joseph Cooper & David W. Brady, Toward 
a Diachronic Analysis of Congress, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 988, 988 (1981) (“[T]he concepts and 
measures required to provide an adequate basis [of current structures] need to be developed through 
diachronic, rather than merely static, analysis.”). 
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agenda, ensuring that some issues are never seriously considered.”20 Using a 
similar critical lens, the analysis below examines regulatory debates over EGU-
sourced mercury as “struggles to define problems and characterize solutions within 
a rhetorical and institutional context . . . .”21 This article explores the historical 
large-scale regulatory, ideological, and political narratives that have impacted 
mercury regulation decisions, with a particular focus on the discursive practices 
and tactics used in different policymaking processes to show how different actors 
have “define[d] problems and characterize[d] solutions” surrounding 
environmental mercury in a way that has served economic and ideological interests, 
but not necessarily public health. The analysis taken here seeks not simply to “tell[] 
a story” but to do so in a manner that will offer insight into how policy is 
developed and how such discursive strategies can push implementation of laws in 
directions unforeseen – and unwanted – by the lawmakers who created them.22 
Part I below consists of a brief technical background on the current state 
of the science of mercury, with a focus on scientific uncertainty in regards to its 
environmental cycling and its public health impacts that have impacted regulatory 
decisions, and current control options. Part II forms the largest and most central 
component of this article, examining the creation of the CAA and the history of 
mercury emissions regulation under it, focusing on the legislative and regulatory 
battles over EGU-sourced mercury, and how those battles fit into the larger policy 
debate about air toxics regulation over the past forty years. It divides this history of 
mercury emissions regulations into three different historical periods, representing: 
(1) the creation of the CAA until 1989; (2) the passage of the 1990 CAA 
Amendments until the 2000 Listing Decision; and (3) the period from the 2000 
Listing Decision until the present, analyzing each period in the context of that 
larger narrative. Part III concludes by discussing the evolution of regulatory 
narratives over EGU-sourced mercury and the historic costs of this inaction in 
terms of human health, and offers suggestions to improve future legal and 
regulatory decisions about mercury specifically and other air toxics in general by 
more openly engaging with questions of value. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Environmental Mercury: Science and Uncertainty 
Mercury is ubiquitous in the environment, where it is found in mostly 
trace amounts in air and water across the globe. Environmental mercury has both 
 
 20. LAYZER supra note 16, at 11 (quoting Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the 
Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 243, 243 (2004)). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See KAREN T. LITFIN, OZONE DISCOURSES: SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 191 (Helen Milner & John Gerard Ruggie eds., 1994). As articulated 
by Professor Litfin, the value of a discursive approach to environmental policy analysis is that it can 
“offer important insights into the policy process in general and perhaps into future events. . . . It can 
alert the analyst to certain misconceptions that might arise, and it can also alert the practitioner to the 
importance of alternative discursive strategies.” 
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natural and anthropogenic sources; natural sources include volcanoes, weathering 
of mercury-containing rocks and soils, and wildfires, while anthropogenic sources 
include fossil fuel combustion, gold and other metal production, cement 
production, waste incineration, and various industrial processes.23 Environmental 
mercury levels have increased steadily since the mid-19th century, almost certainly 
due to human activities,24 though levels may be declining since the 1980s.25 
Organic mercury compounds pose the greatest health risk, particularly since they 
tend to be concentrated to unsafe levels up the food chain in marine and aquatic 
environments.   
Coal combustion is the largest single source of anthropogenic mercury 
emissions to the atmosphere.26 Coal-fired EGUs are significant emitters of 
mercury, though mercury content of coal varies depending on coal type and 
geographic origin.27 One recent estimate of worldwide mercury emissions from 
stationary combustion (most of it coal combustion), places emissions at 
approximately 970 tpy, with 79 tons originating in North America.28 In 1997, EPA 
estimated EGU-sourced mercury emissions in the United States at 47 tpy,29 a 
number that was used as a baseline in EGU mercury emissions regulatory debates 
through about 2011, though subsequently other CAA regulations and state 
regulations were projected to reduce mercury emissions to an estimated 29 tpy in 
2016.30 
 
 23. Nicola Pirrone et al., Global Mercury Emissions to the Atmosphere from Anthropogenic and 
Natural Sources, 10 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 5951, 5952–53 (2010). See generally 
William H. Schroeder & John Munthe, Atmospheric Mercury—An Overview, 32 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 
810 (1998) (providing an overview of all major aspects of mercury in the atmosphere). 
 24. See D. H. Landers et al., Using Lake Sediment Mercury Flux Ratios to Evaluate the Regional 
and Continental Dimensions of Mercury Deposition in Arctic and Boreal Ecosystems, 32 ATMOSPHERIC 
ENV’T 919, 919–20, 928 (1998). 
 25. UNEP MERCURY REPORT, supra note 13, at 16 tbl.Emissions to air. However, different 
methodological approaches to quantifying both anthropogenic and natural mercury emissions 
inventories over the years complicates determining long-term trends. See id. at 16. 
 26. Pacyna et al., supra note 7, at 2488 (“[C]oal burning is the largest anthropogenic source of 
mercury emission to the atmosphere.”). In terms of mercury emissions to all media, including land and 
water, artisanal gold mining is estimated to be a larger source, at approximately 1,102 tons per year 
(tpy), though only about 441 tpy is estimated to be emissions to the atmosphere. Pirrone et al., supra 
note 23, at 5956. For the sake of consistency, I have converted the metric tons used in this and certain 
other references to American short tons throughout this article. 
 27. The estimated worldwide average mercury content of coal is in the neighborhood of 100–400 
parts per billion, though it can vary from 1 part per billion to 330 parts per million, or by a factor of 
330,000. Parisa A. Ariya et al., Mercury Physiochemical and Biogeochemical Transformation in the 
Atmosphere and at Atmospheric Interfaces: A Review and Future Directions, 115 CHEMICAL REVIEWS 
3760 (2015). 
 28. Pacyna et al., supra note 7, at 2493 tbl.3. 
 29. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS (1997) [hereinafter 1997 
EPA MERCURY REPORT], Vol. I, at 3-6 tbl.3-1 (combining mercury emission totals for Coal, Oil, and 
Natural gas combustion sources for the total mercury emissions produced by Utility boiler combustion 
sources) All volumes of the 1997 EPA Mercury Report can be found at 
https://www.epa.gov/mercury/mercury-study-report-congress. 
 30. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-11-009, REVISED TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: 
NATIONAL-SCALE ASSESSMENT OF MERCURY RISK TO POPULATIONS WITH HIGH CONSUMPTION OF 
SELF-CAUGHT FRESHWATER FISH 8 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 Technical Support Document or 2011 
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Toxicity and absorption of mercury depends on both the form of mercury 
as well as the route of exposure, but most forms are neurotoxic. Organomercury 
compounds like methylmercury, the kind most frequently found in fish, tend to be 
the most toxic. 31 Prenatal exposure to organic mercury can interfere with brain 
development; high prenatal doses have been linked to severe intellectual 
disabilities, blindness, seizure disorders, and deafness. Even low doses may cause 
more subtle cognitive impairments, such as reduced motor function and lower IQ.32 
Elemental mercury is less dangerous through ingestion or contact, but inhaling high 
levels of mercury vapors can lead to adverse health effects, including tremors and 
aggression.33 
Despite significant epidemiological research into the impact of consuming 
methylmercury-containing fish, the level at which methylmercury causes health 
impacts in human populations is still unknown. Numerous longitudinal studies 
have been carried out, with frustratingly varied results between populations, a fact 
which has been a common tactic to forestall regulation.34 
B. Mercury Emissions Control 
Due to its low concentration and chemical characteristics, controlling 
mercury emissions from combustion sources like EGUs can be difficult.35 EPA has 
identified four general control techniques: (1) pre-combustion pollution prevention 
measures (such as product substitution or process modification); (2) coal cleaning; 
(3) alternative approaches (e.g., emissions trading or use taxes); and (4) flue gas 
treatment technologies.36 Because almost all coal contains mercury, and because 
 
TSD], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/utility/revisedmercurytsd.pdf (“The [EPA’s] estimated Hg 
emissions from U.S. EGUs in 2016 . . . is 29 tons, after other CAA related regulations are fully 
implemented.). The 29 tons figure represents a baseline figure not reflecting any mercury-specific EGU 
pollution controls. Id. 
 31. For example, in one widely publicized incident, a chemist at Dartmouth accidentally spilled 
several drops of dimethylmercury, a particularly toxic form, on her latex-gloved hand and died from 
mercury poisoning within a year. David W. Nierenberg et al., Delayed Cerebellar Disease and Death 
After Accidental Exposure to Dimethylmercury, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1672, 1672 (1998). 
 32. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF METHYLMERCURY 17 (2000) 
[hereinafter 2000 NRC REPORT].  
 33. Thomas W. Clarkson et al., The Toxicology of Mercury – Current Exposures and Clinical 
Manifestations, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1731, 1733 (2003). 
 34. A longitudinal study is one where measurements or observations are made of the same subject 
at different periods of time over a study. 
 35. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-47, CLEAN AIR ACT: MERCURY CONTROL 
TECHNOLOGIES AT COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS HAVE ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL EMISSIONS 
REDUCTIONS 3 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 GAO REPORT], http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1047.pdf 
(“Mercury is emitted in such low concentrations that its removal and measurement are particularly 
difficult, and it is emitted in several forms. . . . “). The 2009 GAO REPORT provides a nontechnical 
review of mercury emissions reduction technologies. More recently, UNEP has released a draft 
guidance document on mercury emissions controls. See generally UNITED NATIONS ENVTL. 
PROGRAMME, GUIDANCE ON BEST AVAILABLE TECHNIQUES AND BEST ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES TO 
CONTROL MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS AND COAL-FIRED INDUSTRIAL 
BOILERS (2015). 
 36. 1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 29, Vol. VIII, at ES-8. Coal cleaning is the physical or 
chemical removal of impurities from coal such as sulfur (to which mercury is often bound). Id. at ES-9. 
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coal cleaning (removing mercury pre-combustion) has limited effectiveness,37 
technical approaches typically focus on developing flue gas treatment technologies 
to remove mercury from flue gas after combustion but before it leaves the 
smokestack. 
The technical and economic feasibility of using specific mercury control 
technologies at a given EGU are dependent on the type of coal used, boiler design, 
and the types of pollution control technologies already in place, though the U.S. 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) has predicted that sorbent-injection systems 
will be able to substantially reduce mercury emissions at a relatively low cost for 
most plants.38 
C. Early Legal and Regulatory Approaches to Mercury Health Risks 
While by the early 20th century numerous laws regulating mercury had 
been implemented at the state level, they focused solely on protecting the public 
from direct exposure to mercury products.39 No such regulations existed at the 
federal level.40 In the wake of the first Earth Day on April 22, 1970, and in 
response to a public that demanded concerted action by the federal government to 
mitigate pollution, the then-existing patchwork of state and federal approaches to 
pollution control was supplanted in large part with more comprehensive federal 
frameworks. The new federal laws would largely supplant rather than supplement 
traditional tort claims over environmental contaminants.41 
Even before the creation of EPA and the environmental laws it would 
implement and enforce, mercury ranked highly as a contaminant of particular 
concern; members of the Senate held two days of hearings in the summer of 1970 
on the threat environmental mercury posed to both humans and the environment.42 
 
Flue gas is the byproduct of combustion emitted to the atmosphere, which can treated before it is 
released from the stack. Id. at ES-11to ES-13. 
 37. See id. at 6-1 (“The available data on coal cleaning indicate that mercury reductions ranged 
from zero to 64 percent. The average reduction was 21 percent.”). 
 38. 2009 GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 27. 
 39. E.g., N.C. Revisal of 1908, ch. 95, § 4489 (1908) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or 
deliver to any person . . . [t]he compounds and salts of . . . mercury,” except as provided by statute.); 
MINN. STAT. § 2337 (1905) (“No person, otherwise than on a physician’s written prescription, shall sell 
at retail . . . mercury . . . without affixing to the package or receptacle containing the same a label 
conspicuously bearing the word ‘Poison’. . . . “); Act of Apr. 1, 1912, ch. 351, § 1, 1912 N.J. Laws 603 
(requiring every physician to report instances of occupationally related mercury poising to the state 
board of health). 
 40. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 outlawed the sale of “adulterated” food in general, but 
mercury was not specifically listed as an adulterant in the statute or the implementing regulations of the 
time. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59–384, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Act of June 25, 
1938, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1059 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 41. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (“[T]he Clean Air Act 
and EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-
dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”); Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea 
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 11, 22 (1981) (holding that the Clean Water Act fully pre-empted federal 
common law of nuisance in terms of ocean pollution). 
 42. Effects of Mercury on Man and the Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy, 
Nat. Res., and the Env’t of the S. Committee on Commerce, 91st Cong. (1970). 
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Similarly, in the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) first annual report, the 
CEQ recognized toxic mercury pollution as “a serious national problem.”43 
II. MERCURY REGULATION UNDER CAA 
Most of the contemporary debate and controversy over regulating mercury 
emissions has taken place in the context of the CAA, arguably the most 
important—and most fought-over—federal statute arising in that “golden age” of 
federal environmental law. The CAA and its implementing regulations 
promulgated by EPA have been the primary regulatory instruments through which 
the federal government (and by delegation, state governments) regulates 
atmospheric emissions of pollutants and potential pollutants from both stationary 
and mobile sources. 
The CAA replaced earlier, more limited federal air pollution measures that 
had been created in the preceding decades in response to growing public concern 
over air quality. While some states had already taken steps to statutorily abate such 
pollutants,44 these actions were hampered by air pollutants’ movement across state 
borders.45 The Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 was the first federal regulation to 
address air pollution, providing funding for research and technical assistance; 
however, as its drafter reassured his colleagues, it was not intended to intrude on 
the states’ authority to control air pollution.46 While the federal government’s 
advisory role was maintained in amendments to that act in 1960 and 1962, growing 
public (and legislative) support for federal intervention into pollution abatement led 
to the passage of the Air Quality Act of 1963, amended in 1967, which allowed the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to set emissions criteria. However, 
the Department’s enforcement ability was limited to requesting the Department of 
Justice bring suit for pollution abatement, and even then could only request such a 
suit after a long series of administrative procedures had been followed.47 
 
 43. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 52 
(1970), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED062109.pdf ; see also Addition to List of HAPs, 36 Fed. Reg. 
5931 (Mar. 31, 1971). The CEQ was created by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 
91-190, § 202, 83 Stat. 854 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2012)). The Council was created 
to, inter alia, advise the President on environmental matters, and assist him in preparing the required 
annual Environmental Quality Report Council, which was required by statute until 1997, when that 
requirement was removed pursuant to the Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 104-66, § 1091(b), 109 Stat. 707 (1995); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970) (prior NEPA annual 
report requirement). 
 44. STANLEY E. DEGLER, STATE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 1 (rev. ed. 1970) (“In 1970, all 
50 states had laws to control air pollution.”). By 1963 only 14 states had air pollution control laws at a 
state-wide level, id. at 2, though after the passage of the CAA of 1967 this would grow to 46 by 1969. 
Id. at 1. However, not all states with authority to regulate air pollution used that authority. Only four 
states (Alabama, Maine, Nebraska, and South Dakota) had no statutory authority under state law to 
regulate air pollution, though they could do so under nuisance statutes. See id. at 1-32 (describing air 
pollution laws in all fifty states); see also Harold W. Kennedy & Andrew O. Porter, Air Pollution: Its 
Control and Abatement, 8 VAND. L. REV. 854 (1955). 
 45. See generally Edmund S. Muskie, Role of the Federal Government in Air Pollution Control, 10 
ARIZ. L. REV. 17 (1969) (discussing the difficulties of establishing jurisdictional responsibility in the 
field of pollution control). 
 46. CHRISTOPHER J. BAILEY, CONGRESS AND AIR POLLUTION 94–96 (1998). 
 47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c)–(f) (1964). 
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Public concerns over pollutants during this time period tended to focus on 
more visible pollutants, with priority to chemical components or precursors of 
highly visible, predominately urban air pollution, particularly the ozone relating to 
photochemical smog, as well as particulates and sulfur dioxide (SO2), a noxious, 
terrible-smelling compound known for causing lung irritation and illness.48 
However, through the 1970s, scientists, policymakers, and the general public had 
become more aware of invisible toxics, thanks in large part to Rachel Carson’s 
seminal 1962 work, Silent Spring,49 which likely helped drive creation of the HAP 
provisions of the CAA. 
Dissatisfied with what was perceived as ineffective regulation under the 
earlier Clean Air Act of 1963 (and its 1967 amendments), and faced with growing 
clamor from the states for federal intervention, Congress essentially rewrote the air 
pollution regulatory scheme in 1970 with the CAA, implementing a comprehensive 
statute which, among other things, established procedures for EPA to set and 
enforce emissions standards and strengthened enforcement mechanisms. 
Regulation of mercury seems fairly straightforward—the dangers of environmental 
mercury were fairly well known then, and a Senate committee report during the 
drafting process expressly suggested mercury as a possible future regulated 
substance.50 However, attempts to do so under the CAA have been piecemeal and, 
when it comes to EGU-sourced mercury, unsuccessful for most of the CAA’s 
history. The CAA and its implementing regulations contain several different 
mechanisms for limiting air pollutants from both stationary and mobile sources, 
though only the stationary source provisions are of significant relevance to mercury 
regulations.51 An enormously complex statute, the CAA contains numerous 
provisions applying to different pollutants, areas, and sources; addressed below are 
the primary regulatory tools for governing general pollutants from stationary 
sources like EGUs. 
 
 48. See Bailey, supra note 46, at 129. See generally Matthias Dörries, The Transmutation of Ozone 
in the Early 1970s, in TOXIC AIRS: BODY, PLACE, PLANET IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (James Rodger 
Fleming &Ann Johnson eds., 2014) (exploring the debate over ozone from the 1950s, with a particular 
focus on the 1970s). 
 49. Though focused on pesticides, particularly DDT, the book held one reference to mercury, 
referring to it as a “poison” used in some crabgrass killers. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 80 
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 1994) (1962). 
 50. ENVTL. POLICY DIV, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. & LIBRARY OF CONG., S. COMM. ON PUB. 
WORKS, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 133 (1974) 
(“Examples of substances which the Administration informed the Senate were likely to be controlled 
under [section 112 include] mercury. . . . “). 
 51. Unless otherwise specified, the general provisions described here have been a part of the CAA 
from its passage in 1970 until the time of this writing, with cites to the statute based on the present U.S. 
Code. Mercury is not emitted from mobile sources in any significant quantities, so provisions of the 
CAA applying strictly to mobile sources are not discussed. 
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A. Pollutant Regulation Provisions of the CAA Applying to Stationary 
Sources 
1. CAA Section 108: National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
To control the ubiquitous, large-scale pollutants like ozone, SO2 and 
nitrogen oxides (NOX) which affect air quality over large areas, Congress enacted 
CAA Section 108,52 which requires the creation of state- or EPA-designated air 
quality regions and the designation of national ambient air quality standards 
(NAAQS) for pollutants, which “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare; [and] the presence of which in the ambient air results from 
numerous diverse mobile or stationary sources . . . .”53 Such standards restrict the 
level of criteria pollutants permitted in the ambient air in a region, with states then 
directly regulating sources within their jurisdiction through State Implementation 
Plans (SIPs) tailored to meet those NAAQS requirements.54 Failing to meet 
NAAQS deadlines, or submitting SIPs that do not meet EPA approval, may subject 
states to potential penalties.55 While nothing in the CAA’s original text precluded 
mercury from being regulated as a criteria pollutant, regulation under Section112 
(discussed in Section IIA3 below) as a HAP shortly after passage barred mercury’s 
designation as a criteria pollutant, and the 1990 Amendments firmly established 
that mercury emissions, including EGU emissions, were to be regulated under 
Section 112.56 Since the CAA’s passage, Section 108 has never been used or 
proposed as a direct mercury regulatory mechanism, though as discussed in Section 
 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2012). Both primary and secondary standards are set, with the primary 
standards designed to protect public health “allowing an adequate margin of safety,” and less stringent 
secondary standards aimed at protecting the “public welfare.” Id. § 7409. As currently codified, the 
distinction is not particularly important since air quality regions are considered non-attainment under 
CAA section 107(d) if they fail to meet either primary or secondary standards. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 54. In 1971, EPA promulgated regulations designating six NAAQS criteria pollutants: SO2, 
particulates, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons, and NOX. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186 
(Apr. 30, 1971) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4–50.11). In 1978, EPA designated lead as a criteria 
pollutant, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (Oct. 5, 1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.12), but has not designated any 
additional criteria pollutants since then. 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2012). The NAAQS deadlines have been extended repeatedly through the 
years, and with the 1990 Amendments “nonattainment areas” not meeting NAAQS requirements are 
classified into separate categories, with requirements and compliance deadlines differing depending on 
category. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 181–193, 104 Stat. 2399 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511–7515 (2012)). The 1990 Amendments also added the requirement that in 
nonattainment areas even old sources must be required to use reasonably available control technology 
(“RACT”) to control criteria pollutant emissions. Id. § 182 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a) (2012)). 
 56. A separate but related provision is CAA Part C, designated as Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration of Air Quality (“PSD”) which requires EPA and state governments to implement 
additional permitting requirements ensuring that air quality is not degraded in other areas that have 
attained NAAQS standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492. As originally implemented in the 1977 
Amendments, PSD restrictions could be placed on non-criteria pollutants, including mercury. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7470–7491 (1988); see also Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 361 n.90 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(noting in dicta that “the fact that emission of mercury is not [regulated under section 112 does not] 
mean[] that mercury is not a pollutant subject to regulation [under PSD].”). However, following the 
1990 Amendments, section 112 HAPs are excluded from regulation under the PSD provisions. 42 
U.S.C. § 7412(b)(6) (2012). 
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II(D)(2)(d) below, controls for some types of criteria pollutants can also reduce 
mercury emissions as a co-benefit. 
2. CAA Section 111: New Source Pollution Standards 
 
 While Section 108 allows states some flexibility in the actual emissions 
standards set in SIPs so long as the region’s ambient air quality goals can be met, 
Section 111 requires EPA to directly regulate emissions standards for new sources 
of pollutants “caus[ing], or contribut[ing] significantly to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”57 A “new source” 
under the statute means one that is constructed or modified in a way that increases 
its emission of any air pollutant after EPA has set emissions standards.58 Standards 
are based on the best emissions reduction system achievable, taking into account 
costs, and energy and non-air environmental impacts.59 The section provides that 
the states may implement and enforce EPA’s new source standards through SIPs, 
though Section 111(c)(2) allows EPA to directly enforce standards for those new 
sources.60 The sole major attempt to regulate EGU-sourced mercury under Section 
111 NSPS provisions was under the Bush-era EPA’s Clear Skies Plan, discussed in 
more detail in Section D1 below. 
Under the NSPS sections as originally enacted, EPA could also apply the 
new source emissions standards to already-existing sources, but only if those 
pollutants were not already regulated as criteria pollutants (under Section 108) or 
HAPs (under Section 112); this provision was intended primarily to serve as a 
“‘gap-filling’ measure for ‘pollutants which cannot be controlled through the 
ambient air quality standards and which are not hazardous substances.’”61 Whether 
that provision survived the 1990 Amendments without substantive change is 
uncertain at the time of this writing. Due to a legislative error arising out of the 
1990 Amendments and discussed in more detail in Section D1 below, Section 
111(d) currently may preclude regulating those sources that are already regulated 
as HAP, even if the specific pollutant itself is not regulated.62 
 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A). “New sources” under Section 111 refers to stationary sources 
constructed or modified after standards of performance have been promulgated. Id. § 7411(a)(2). 
 58. Id. § 7411(a)(2)–(4). 
 59. Id. § 7411(a)(1)–(2). 
 60. Id. § 7411(c)(1). 
 61. Frank B. Cross, Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: A New Approach to the Control of 
Airborne Carcinogens, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 215, 233 (1986) (quoting A legislative History of 
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1970) 227 (statement of Sen. 
Muskie)). 
 62. The Senate and the House of Representatives passed different versions of section 111(d) in the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The Senate version prevents EPA from regulating pollutants under 
section 111(d) that are also regulated under section 112, while the House version prevents EPA from 
regulating sources that are regulated under section 111(d). While the issue came up in West Virginia v. 
EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 27, 2016) (en banc), regarding the Clean Power Plan, it has not yet 
been resolved. See Andrew Childers, Clean Power Plan Scrutinized Through Lens of Supreme Court, 
BLOOMBERG BNA: ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.bna.com/clean-power-plan-
n57982077646/. 
Winter 2018 ALCHEMICAL RULEMAKING 139 
3. CAA Section 112: Hazardous Air Pollutants 
Historically, however, the CAA sections most relevant to mercury 
regulation are the HAP provisions under Section 112.63 This section mandates that 
EPA set emissions standards for HAPs that pose a “threat of adverse human health 
effects . . . or adverse environmental effects . . . .”64 The statutory language is 
ambiguous as to whether a pollutant should be regulated as a NAAQS criteria 
pollutant or as a HAP, though throughout the lifetime of the CAA ubiquitous 
pollutants that are usually dangerous in large quantities have been defined as 
criteria pollutants.65 Contaminants that are significantly more toxic in smaller 
amounts have been more often defined as HAPs.66 As with NSPS, EPA sets 
specific national emissions standards itself rather than through individualized SIPs, 
though this does not preclude state-level emissions standards that are more 
restrictive,67 and the states can and typically do handle permitting and enforcement 
regarding compliance with the HAP regulations.68 
The 1970 version of the original CAA required EPA to designate a 
substance as a HAP if it “may cause, or contribute to, an increase in mortality or an 
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness.”69 While as 
written it did not expressly permit EPA to limit HAP regulations by source, shortly 
after the statute’s creation, EPA interpreted it as doing so,70 and in 1990, Congress 
codified this interpretation.71 Unlike with Section 111, all sources of emissions are 
 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
 64. Id. § 7412(b)(2). 
 65. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 46–49 
(2004). 
 66. See Williamson et al., supra note 8 at 705 (“Hazardous air pollution regulation focuses 
primarily on protecting individuals downwind of toxic releases from direct exposure.”); John D. 
Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens under Section 112 of 
the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 108 (1985) (“The toxic air pollutants to be regulated under 
section 112 were supposed to be more dangerous . . . than the criteria pollutants.”). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(7). 
 68. The initial version of the CAA provided that “[i]f the Administrator finds the [submitted] State 
procedure is adequate, he shall delegate to such State any authority he has under this [Act] to implement 
and enforce such standards. . . . “ 42 U.S.C. § 1857(c)(1) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 
7412(d)(1) (2012)). The CAA of 1990 reserved the right of the Federal government to delegate 
implementation and enforcement procedures to the states, but provided more detailed information on 
state responsibility, and provided for research and management assistance. 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(a)(1) (1970) (amended 1977). 
 70. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A COLLECTION OF LEGAL OPINIONS, Vol. I: DECEMBER 1970-
DECEMBER. 1973, at 100 (1975) (“[W]e believe that §112 standards should be made applicable only to 
designated sources. Whenever it appears that additional sources may emit the pollutant in question in 
unsafe amounts, we will immediately investigate the situation and propose and promulgate regulations 
as necessary to protect the public health.”). EPA’s decision to list HAPs as limited to those from specific 
sources appears to have gone largely unchallenged, though the President’s Council on Environmental 
Quality originally took a different interpretation. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY: THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1971), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED055922.pdf 
(“Asbestos, mercury, and beryllium have been designated as hazardous air pollutants for which Federal 
emissions standards, applicable to all sources, will be promulgated.”) (emphasis added). 
 71. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 2531 (current version at 
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012). 
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regulated, whether old or new.72 When setting those limits EPA was required to, 
within 180 days, propose standards that were “at the level which in [EPA’s] 
judgment provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public health from such 
hazardous air pollutant,” with no allowances for cost.73 Even when, as shown 
below, the 1990 amendments liberalized how emissions standards were 
determined, the focus of CAA Section 112 has remained on public health. 
When first passed, Congress clearly intended the CAA to force aggressive 
EPA regulation of HAPs under CAA Section 112(a)(1).74 The Nixon 
Administration was less enthusiastic, recommending unsuccessfully during 
Conference proceedings that the entirety of Section 112 be removed.75 In practice, 
however, the first two decades of the CAA’s existence saw little action taken by 
EPA to designate and control substances as HAPs. 
B. Regulating Mercury as a HAP: 1971-1989 
1. Mercury Emissions and HAP Regulations in the CAA’s First Decade 
Despite the nominal strength of the HAP provisions, their reliance on the 
initiative of the executive branch quickly proved a barrier to regulation. Shortly 
after the creation of both EPA and the CAA, the Nixon administration, worried 
particularly about the cost of CAA regulations, quickly put in institutional 
measures to limit EPA’s effective power by allowing the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) a significant oversight role.76 Nixon’s willingness to limit 
EPA’s effectiveness so quickly after its creation was likely a result of personal 
frustration; after disappointing results from the 1970 Congressional elections, and 
resentful over a perceived lack of credit from environmentalists for what he 
accomplished, Nixon likely saw far less political gain to be had from siding with 
those environmentalists of whom he characterized in a meeting with auto industry 
executives as interested in “destroying the system.”77 The CAA especially was 
“[c]onservative critics’ main target during the 1970s.”78 
 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1988). 
 73. See id. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (no mention of cost). 
 74. Id. § 7412(b)(1)(B); see also Graham, supra note 66, at 110, 131, 147–50. 
 75. Graham, supra note 66, at 106 & n.39. 
 76. Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 132–33 (1991); see Robert F. Durant, WHEN 
GOVERNMENT REGULATES ITSELF: EPA, TVA, AND POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE 1970S 26–44 (1985). 
 77. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 77 (2004); J. BROOKS FLIPPEN, 
NIXON AND THE ENVIRONMENT 142 (2000). For a more favorable view of Nixon’s environmental 
legacy, see Russell E. Train, The Environmental Record of the Nixon Administration, 26 PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q. 185 (1996). The first EPA Administrator, William Ruckelshaus, would later state that Nixon 
was incurious about EPA and the issues it addressed, noting, “he [Nixon] never asked me about 
anything going on in EPA. Never.” Michael Gorn, William D. Ruckelshaus: Oral History Interview, 
EPA (Jan. 1993), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/william-d-ruckelshaus-oral-history-
interview.html. 
 78. LAYZER, supra note 16, at 63. 
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Nevertheless, in 1971, EPA included mercury in its first proposed list of 
HAPs, but proposed standards only for chlor-alkali and ore processing facilities.79 
EPA failed to promulgate actual emissions standards within the statutory deadline 
following listing, finally doing so in 1973 after being sued by the Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF).80 EPA’s final rule applied only to the proposed sources, and 
then only to prevent emissions of 1 ppm or over—in other words, levels that were 
considered high enough to be potentially dangerous outside any bioaccumulation 
process.81 In implementing this rule, EPA acknowledged that methylmercury was 
“by far the most hazardous mercury compound, particularly via the ingestion of 
fish,” but declined to regulate source mercury emissions based on whether they 
increased environmental mercury as a whole, offering as a rationale that “[c]urrent 
data on the environmental transport of mercury do not permit a clear assessment of 
the effect of mercury emissions into . . . aquatic and terrestrial environments.”82 
When the first HAP standards for mercury were promulgated there existed 
a large and proliferating body of research on bioaccumulation and 
biomagnification, health effects, and an understanding among the scientific and 
engineering community that EGUs emitted mercury in significant amounts.83 
However, the same time period also saw EGUs having difficulty meeting the 
electricity needs of the public, shortfalls that many at the time believed would be 
exacerbated by environmental regulations.84 By the time the final rule was 
promulgated in April 1973, the economic outlook was grim, as the stock market 
had crashed a few months before, and an energy crisis was clearly on the horizon. 
When Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the 
country was firmly in the grips of that crisis. While environmentalists had some 
hope that Ford would be friendly to environmental initiatives given his experience 
as a federal park ranger, he took little action on the environmental front either for 
or against regulation, ending with an “environmental slate” that was “clean, albeit 
empty.”85 
 
 79. List of HAPs, 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (Mar. 31, 1971) (listing mercury as HAP); Nat’l Emission 
Standards for HAPs, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,239 (Dec. 7, 1971) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (proposing 
emissions standards). 
 80. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 3 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,173 (D.D.C. 1973) (ordering EPA to 
promulgate emissions standards for asbestos, beryllium, and mercury, within sixty days from the entry 
of the court’s order); 38 Fed. Reg. 8820, 8826 (Apr. 6, 1973). 
 81. 38 Fed. Reg. at 8824. 
 82. Id. at 8824–25. 
 83. VICTOR W. LAMBOU, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT ON THE PROBLEM OF 
MERCURY EMISSIONS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 14–19, 28 (1972), 
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/9101H8V5.PDF?Dockey=9101H8V5.PDF. This EPA report was 
drafted for an international working group on mercury. 
 84. Philip M. Boffey, Energy Crisis: Environmental Issue Exacerbates Power Supply Problem, 168 
SCI. 1554, 1556–57 (1970). 
 85. JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER & GARY BRYNER, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: DOMESTIC & 
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 51 (Beth A. Gillett et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998). While in 1976, Ford did sign the 
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA), Pub. L. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (2012)) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 
Pub. L. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6901–6992K (2012)), both passed 
with veto-proof majorities in the House and Senate. 
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In 1974, upon petition from the EDF, EPA proposed amending the HAP 
list to include among regulated sources of mercury incineration and drying of 
wastewater treatment plant sludges, limiting mercury emissions from those sources 
to 3,200 grams a day, which EPA calculated would ensure the same 1 ppm mercury 
limits on ambient air adjacent to the source.86 Again, while recognizing the 
potential danger of bioconcentration of environmental mercury in fish, it still 
purported to find too much scientific uncertainty to take action on that issue: “The 
Agency has become increasingly concerned about the total environmental burden 
of mercury, however, and is initiating studies to determine how this aspect can 
most effectively be addressed under the provisions of the Clean Air Act and other 
authorities.”87 
 On October 14, 1975, EPA published its final rule governing 
mercury emissions from wastewater treatment plant sludges.88 It noted that during 
the comment period some participants had suggested other sources, including coal-
fired EGUs, be included, but rejected such an approach, stating that none of those 
sources “emit mercury in such quantities that they are likely to cause the ambient 
mercury concentration to exceed one microgram per cubic meter.”89 In 1987, EPA 
implemented a minor administrative rule to the mercury standards for chlor-alkali 
plants,90 and again considered (or purported to consider) but rejected a 
commenter’s request that the agency re-evaluate the decision not to regulate EGU-
sourced mercury emissions, as well as a separate request that EPA generally “take 
into account total human exposure to mercury, including deposited mercury in its 
more toxic methylated forms.”91 There would be no significant mercury emissions 
regulations until after the 1990 Amendments; EPA took little action during the 
Carter administration on regulating HAPs, a decision that disappointed 
environmentalists,92 though Carter did successfully see CAA renewed, and even 
strengthened in some places.93 During the Carter administration, the National 
 
 86. Proposed Amendments to Nat’l Emission Standards for HAPs, 39 Fed. Reg. 38,064, 38,067 
(Oct. 25, 1974) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Amendments to Standards for Asbestos and Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,297–98 (Oct. 14, 1975) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61). 
 89. Id. at 48,298. However, EPA’s own 1972 report, which reviewed research on mercury 
emissions, does not paint a particularly disparate picture between the environmental effects of mercury 
emissions of EGUs and wastewater sludge incineration; see LAMBOU, supra note 83. 
 90. Nat’l Emissions Standards for HAPs; Review and Revision of the Standards for Mercury, 52 
Fed. Reg. 8724–28 (Mar. 19, 1987). 
 91. Id. at 8725. While conceding that some coal sources had mercury levels of 8 ppm for 
subbituminous coal and 3.3 ppm for bituminous coal, and conceding also that under worst case 
scenarios a large coal-fired plant using 8 ppm coal would reach a ground concentration of 1.0 μg/m3, the 
agency concluded that “typically, mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants are expected to be 
well below the ambient guideline level.” Id. EPA’s rationale seems somewhat inconsistent with the fact 
that EPA had been willing to regulate mercury emissions from sludge incineration even though it 
“estimate[d] that the largest mercury emissions from an existing sludge incinerator . . . is approximately 
one-sixth of the maximum allowable emission.” 40 Fed. Reg. at 48,298. 
 92. Graham, supra note 66, at 112. 
 93. E.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, § 106, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2012)); see also LAYZER, supra note 16, at 68 As noted above, the PSD provisions 
were implemented through the 1977 Amendment. See sources cited supra note 56. 
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Research Council released a comprehensive assessment of environmental mercury 
and its possible health impacts, warning that mercury emissions from EGUs were 
of “special concern,” since such emissions were “currently uncontrolled and the use 
of coal [was] expected to increase significantly.”94 
Despite EPA’s refusal to consider bioaccumulation and biomagnification 
processes when regulating mercury under CAA, during the 1970s both EPA and 
FDA did consider it in other contexts. In 1973, the FDA promulgated an action 
level of .5 ug/g of mercury (or .5 ppm) for seafood, allowing them to remove 
seafood meeting that action level from the market.95 EPA’s own position on 
mercury-based pesticides and fungicides played out far differently than it did for 
EGU-sourced mercury. The Fungicide, Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
of 1947 (FIFRA)96 originally allowed the Department of Agriculture to suspend 
registrations of pesticides that posed an “imminent hazard” to the public, though 
the notoriously agribusiness-friendly department did not vigorously exercise that 
power.97 When that suspension power was transferred to EPA,98 the agency quickly 
took action to cancel the registration of mercury-containing pesticides and 
fungicides based substantially on their environmental and health impacts, primarily 
based on their tendency to bioaccumulate and biomagnify through food webs.99 
2. 1980-1989: The Anti-Regulation Backlash and the Reagan 
Revolution 
Whatever the evolving scientific consensus stated, the 1980 election of the 
fiercely anti-regulation Ronald Reagan made serious oversight of EGU emissions 
by the executive branch extremely unlikely; the 1980s would see particularly 
bruising legislative fights over environmental protections, especially those 
regarding air pollution.100 The seeds of the anti-regulatory backlash had been 
planted in the 1960s and 1970s through the development of a “conservative 
infrastructure” in the form of think tanks and lobbying organizations funded by 
industry and staffed by fiercely pro-business conservative intellectuals. In President 
Reagan, those organizations found a champion willing to fight enthusiastically and 
publicly against environmental protection measures. 
 
 94. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AN ASSESSMENT OF MERCURY IN THE ENVIRONMENT 29 (1978). 
 95. See Kelly Joyce, Is Tuna Safe? A Sociological Analysis of Federal Fish Advisories, in 
MERCURY POLLUTION: A TRANSDISCIPLINARY TREATMENT 79 (Sharon L. Zuber & Michael C. 
Newman eds., 2011). 
 96. Fungicide, Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act of 1947, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012)). 
 97. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b), (c) (2012). 
 98. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 2(a)(8)(i), 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, (Oct. 6, 1970), reprinted 
in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970). 
 99. See Certain Products Containing Mercury: Cancellation of Registration, 37 Fed. Reg. 6419–20 
(Mar. 29, 1972); see also Chapman Chemical Co., 1 E.A.D. 199, 214 (1976) (“[I]n the aquatic 
environment . . . highly toxic methyl mercury by natural biomethylation poses a significant risk to man 
and the environment. I am persuaded that registrants’ evidence in support of the opposite suggests a 
greater optimism than scientific caution. Based on the evidence as a whole, I cannot share that 
optimism.”). 
 100. See Graham, supra note 66, at 113–15. 
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Accordingly, while Nixon had sought political capital from a public 
display of environmental advocacy, Reagan in many ways did the opposite. He 
intentionally and publicly attacked environmental regulations as a pro-business 
regulatory reformer.101 Under his administration, EPA officials were heavily 
recruited from the private sector, including regulated industries, and selected for 
their “ideological purity” by the White House rather than screened by EPA’s 
professional personnel. Reagan’s choice for EPA Administrator, the notoriously 
anti-regulation Anne Gorsuch, slashed her own budget, relaxed environmental 
regulations, and reduced enforcement actions before being forced to resign.102 
Faced with significant public and congressional scrutiny over the state in 
which Gorsuch left EPA, the Reagan administration attempted to bolster its 
environmental credibility by re-appointing William Ruckelshaus, EPA’s first 
administrator, as Gorsuch’s successor. Ruckelshaus, a moderate Republican, was 
fairly well regarded in both political and environmental circles.103 However, he was 
also highly concerned with the potential costs of environmental regulation in 
general, particularly regarding toxics. His second term as EPA administrator 
eventually received a mixed review from environmentalists and pro-regulation 
politicians, though he was considered by some to be the most environmentally-
friendly EPA administrator possible under the Reagan administration.104 On HAP 
regulation, he did little other than promise impending regulatory measures that in 
large part failed to materialize. In a statement given to the House Subcommittee on 
November 7, 1983, Ruckelshaus addressed the failure of EPA to regulate many 
proposed HAPs by blaming in large part the language of §112 itself: 
In implementing the provisions of section 112, the EPA has had 
to make some uncomfortable compromises. We took it as given 
that Congress did not intend for us to virtually ban a number of 
major industrial chemicals. We have, therefore, made judgments 
about safety, about the appropriate balancing of risks and cost 
. . . . We believe that we are in accord with the real intent of 
 
 101. See LAYZER, supra note 16, at 9. See generally Michael E. Kraft & Norman J. Vig, 
Environmental Policy in the Reagan Presidency, 99 POL. SCI. Q. 415, 426–33 (1984) (discussing the 
Reagan administration’s environmental policy and regulation reform). 
 102. See Kraft & Vig, supra note 101, at 426-31. Gorsuch’s resignation was prompted by the 
increasingly public battles with Congress and negative press focused attention that focused not only on 
her extreme antipathy towards environmental regulations but also on charges of political favoritism and 
corruption JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 57–58 (1995). 
 103. Ruckelshaus’ reputation for integrity (Nixon referred to him as “Mr. Clean”) led to him being 
appointed acting director of the FBI, and then Deputy Attorney General, as the Watergate affair began to 
take its toll on the Nixon White House. See FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 397–99 (1995). 
 104. See Philip Shabecoff, E.P.A.; Apres Ruckelshaus le Deluge?, NY TIMES (Dec. 3, 1984), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/03/us/epa-apres-ruckelshaus-le-deluge.html (“Without paradox, 
spokesmen for groups that had been his severest critics expressed dismay and anxiety over Mr. 
Ruckelshaus’s impending departure . . . he was the best Administrator they could hope for while Mr. 
Reagan was in the White House.”). 
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Congress and that the flexibility to balance risks and costs is an 
essential part of EPA’s ability to carry out its mission.105 
Though Ruckelshaus argued EPA had been operating as it expected 
Congress wanted it to, Congress would later disagree.106 Materials provided to 
Congress indicate that in the early 1980s at least some EPA employees intended to 
carry out health assessments of a number of potential HAPs from sources not 
already regulated, but at the same time the agency also appeared to intentionally 
put up procedural roadblocks to delay those assessments.107 In 1983, the GAO 
investigated EPA’s management of regulation under Section 112 in light of its 
failure to list additional HAPs, including thirty-seven priority pollutants already 
identified by EPA.108 In its report, the GAO concluded that a number of 
institutional barriers prevented effective regulation under Section 112, including 
extensive internal reviews of health assessment documents, a lengthy Science 
Advisory Board review process, and EPA’s insistence on collecting “economic and 
technological factors” impacting HAP regulation – which the GAO noted were 
improper under the statute in light of the fact that Section 112 did not provide for 
those kinds of analyses.109 
3. Mercury and Toxics Regulations During the CAA’s First Two 
Decades: Context and Conclusions 
While environmentalists hoped that CAA would significantly limit what 
industry could emit to the air, when it came to HAPs that optimism proved 
unwarranted through the CAA’s first two decades. While restrictions on criteria 
pollutants proved somewhat effective, restrictions on HAPs were scant. Legitimate 
scientific uncertainty was certainly a factor in this inaction; the health and 
environmental effects of toxics, particularly those like mercury, which are naturally 
present in trace amounts and undergo complex transformations in both the 
environment and organisms, are difficult to detect. The inherent statutory 
requirements of CAA Section 112 also likely led in some cases to bureaucratic 
paralysis; as noted above, once a pollutant was listed as a HAP, EPA was required 
to propose emissions standards, and do so quickly. Furthermore, EPA had to 
provide an “ample margin of safety” to protect the “public health,” without any 
consideration of cost or feasibility.110 For many candidate HAPs, that “ample 
margin of safety” would require an unrealistic zero emissions.111 In other words, 
 
 105. EPA’s Air Pollution Control Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 17 (1983) [hereinafter November 
1983 Hearings] (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA). 
 106. See discussion supra Section II.C.1, at pp. 34–35. 
 107. See November 1983 Hearings, supra note 105, at 144–46 (Nov. 3, 1983 Memorandum). 
 108. See COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING. OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-199, DELAYS IN 
EPA’S REGULATIONS OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS (1983), http://www.gao.gov/assets/1
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 109. Id. at 21–23, 28–35, 43–44. 
 110. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988) (containing no mention of cost or feasibility). 
 111. See Health Risk and Economic Impact Assessments of Suspected Carcinogens, 41 Fed. Reg. 
21,402 (May 25, 1976) (“Evidence has accumulated that indicates that the no-threshold concept can also 
be applicable to chemical carcinogens.”); see also Graham, supra note 66, at 130–31. 
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once EPA listed a HAP, it was forced to create a rapid and potentially cost 
prohibitive regulatory scheme, with little flexibility to avoid potentially 
economically catastrophic consequences. Several commentators during that time 
period argued that it was this reason, rather than partisan affiliation or 
environmental ideology, that led to inaction.112 Reducing EGU-sourced mercury in 
particular would also have been difficult during this time because stringent mercury 
reduction technologies were unavailable. While anti-regulation forces during this 
time period failed to substantially weaken CAA due to strong congressional and 
public resistance, the wide discretion the executive branch enjoyed in rulemaking 
and enforcement actions allowed EPA to delay regulations, and minimize the 
impact on industry of those that did get through. 
C. The CAA Amendments of 1990 and their Aftermath: 1990-2000 
1. Development of the 1990 Amendments 
By the end of the 1980s, and despite EPA’s earlier promises to Congress, 
EPA had still only listed eight HAPs under Section 112.113 In 1988, Congress was 
faced with a president who had indicated a greater willingness to accept 
environmental regulations.114 Distrustful of EPA in light of its actions during the 
Reagan administration, the more pro-environmentally-minded members of 
Congress began work on what would become the 1990 Clean Air Act 
 
 112. E.g., Graham, supra note 66, at 116 (“The EPA’s failure to implement section 112 . . . is not 
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 113. See Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 
1721, 1774 (1991) (“EPA proved unwilling or unable to mount an effective regulatory program in its 
twenty-year effort to implement section 112.”); November 1983 Hearings, supra note 105, at 2 (“At this 
moment more than 25 substances are candidates for [HAP] listing at the EPA. Unfortunately, they have 
been candidates not for weeks or months, but for years. That is a sorry record.”); Clean Air Act 
Amendments (Part 3): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, supra note 112, at 295 (testimony of David D. Doniger, Senior Att’y, Natural 
Resources Defense Council) (“In nearly 19 years since the Clean Air Act of 1970 was enacted, EPA has 
done extraordinarily little to protect the American people and their environment from toxic air 
pollutants.”). 
 114. See Susan Page, Bush Bucks Reagan Over Environment, NEWSDAY, 17 May 1988, at 15 
(discussing then Vice President George Bush’s call for greater environmental protections); Hugh 
McIntosh, Catching Up on the Clean Air Act, 101 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 226, 228 (1993). Nixon had 
actually considered but rejected George H. W. Bush as the first EPA Administrator, believing his ties to 
the Texas oil industry would be a political liability. LAZARUS, supra note 77, at 76. 
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Amendments, which incorporated some of the elements of the earlier HAP-related 
bills but went much further.115 
While earlier unsuccessful congressional bills had attempted to force EPA 
to take action on a number of potential HAPs, the 1990 Amendments went much 
further, listing 189 pollutants as HAPs and requiring EPA to either remove those 
pollutants from the list—if it could determine there was adequate data that showed 
no adverse health or environmental effects—or set emissions standards for each 
over a ten year period for “major sources” of those pollutants.116 The Amendments 
defined “major sources” to be those that release 10 tpy of any HAP or 25 tpy or 
more of any combination of HAPs.117 
As an apparent concession to critics’ charge that the Section 112 
rulemaking process could result in burdensome results with little flexibility, taking 
into account logistical and economic complications, the 1990 Amendments also 
fundamentally changed how HAP emissions standards were to be set. Dropping an 
absolute requirement that EPA set those standards that “provide[] an ample margin 
of safety to protect the public health,”118 the 1990 Amendments instead allowed 
emissions standards for both new and existing sources that reflected “the maximum 
degree of reduction in [HAP] emissions . . . taking into consideration the cost of 
achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air quality health and 
environmental impacts and energy requirements. . . . “119 The standards developed 
to implement this “maximum degree of reduction” for HAPs was characterized as 
the Maximum Achievable Control Technology, or MACT standards. For new 
sources, the minimum standard, or MACT floor, could not be less stringent than the 
“best controlled similar source.”120 For existing sources, however, the MACT floor 
could be set at a less stringent standard – “the average emission limitation by the 
best performing 12% of the existing sources . . . . “121 
 
 115. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). For a detailed 
account of the legislative history of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments by one of its architects, see 
Waxman, supra note 113. 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)–(3), (e)(1) (2012). A subsequent Congressional joint resolution 
removed hydrogen sulfide from the list. Act of Dec. 4, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-187, 105 Stat. 1285 
(1991). Since the 1990 CAA Amendments were passed, EPA has only successfully removed three HAPs 
through the section 112(b)(3)(A) delisting process. Those HAPs are caprolactam, 40 C.F.R. § 63.60 
(2016), methyl ethyl ketone, id. § 63.61, and ethylene glycol monobutyl ether, id. § 60.63. 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1). 
 118. Id. § 7412(b)(9). 
 119. Id. § 7412(d)(2). 
 120. Id. § 7412(d)(3). As with the NSPS provisions of section 111, a “new source” refers to a 
stationary source constructed or modified after emissions standards have been promulgated. Id. § 
7412(a)(4). 
 121. Id. § 7412(d)(3)(A). As will be discussed later, EPA has a significant amount of leeway in 
deciding what makes up that 12% of best performing existing standards. The 1990 Amendments also 
require the administrator to review residual risks not addressed by MACT standards within 8 years of 
emissions standards promulgation, and if need be, institute more stringent controls. Id. § 7412(f)(2)(A). 
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2. EGU-Specific HAP Provisions of the 1990 Amendments 
The new HAP provisions applied to all major sources except EGUs, where 
Congress implemented a “unique procedure.”122 The original Senate version of the 
bill sent to conference gave EPA five years after enactment to regulate mercury and 
particulate HAPs from sources that accounted for at least 90% of the aggregate 
emissions – which would by necessity include EGUs for mercury as well as other 
HAPs.123 Even given a five year deadline, the proposed standards deadline for 
EGU-sourced mercury particularly faced significant resistance from industry and 
its allies in Congress, nominally due to both scientific and technical uncertainties 
though the increased costs of mercury controls was almost certainly the primary 
concern. Furthermore, members of Congress believed that separate acid rain 
provisions in the bill would also control EGU-sourced HAPs sufficiently to obviate 
the need for separate HAP standards.124 
During conference, therefore, language was added to the Section 112 
amendments exempting EGUs from the same regulation schedule as other major 
sources of the 189 pollutants.125 Instead, the 1990 Amendments required EPA to 
first carry out a study (“Utility Study”) to evaluate the risks from EGU-sourced 
HAPs, particularly mercury, before deciding whether it was “necessary and 
appropriate” to regulate EGUs under Section 112.126 Additionally, Section 112(n) 
required two other reports to follow: (1) a National Institute of Environmental 
Health Sciences (NIEHS) report on the level at which mercury becomes dangerous, 
also due within three years; and (2) an EPA study of EGU-sourced mercury and its 
potential health impacts, due within four years; EPA study would come to play an 
outsized role in subsequent debates.127 Once the Utility Study was issued, EPA was 
 
 122. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 (2015). 
 123. S. 1630, 101st Cong. § 112(c)(6), (e)(5)(D) (1990) (as engrossed in Senate). 
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779 (1998) (Oct. 27, 1990 statement by Sen. Burdick, Chair of the Senate Environment and Public 
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from coal-fired power plants would double the cost of acid rain control with no expectation of 
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 125. EGUs would otherwise automatically qualify as “major sources” due to the fact that they 
release—or have the potential to release—well in excess of the 25 tpy limits of section 112(a)(1), most 
of that in the form of hydrogen chloride. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STUDY 
OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERATING UNITS -- 
FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3-18 to 3-19 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 UTILITY STUDY], https://www3.epa.
gov/ttn/atw/combust/utiltox/eurtc1.pdf (showing HAP emissions from a characteristic coal- and oil-fired 
EGUs). 
 126. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
 127. Id. § 7412(n)(1)(A)–(C) . EPA was also tasked with a fourth study to be conducted in 
cooperation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) examining the 
contribution of atmospheric HAPs generally to pollution loading in the Great Lakes and coastal waters. 
Id. § 7412(m). 
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required to rely on it to determine whether it was “appropriate and necessary” to 
regulate EGU-sourced HAPs.128 
In 1992, during the time in which the statutorily required studies were in 
process, President Clinton had assumed office. Though a Democrat, his 
administration disappointed many environmentalists who felt he was too willing to 
compromise with regulated industries. Indeed, through most of his tenure EPA 
mercury and HAP reports went unreleased.129 
3. EPA and NRC Mercury Reports: Conclusions and Controversies 
The NIEHS finished its study by 1995,130 but EPA’s reports were delayed 
well past their deadlines, drawing congressional pressure. In May 1997, Sen. 
Patrick Leahy introduced a resolution on the Senate floor urging EPA to release the 
mercury report to Congress as required by the 1990 Amendments, though it later 
died in committee.131 However, pressure on EPA appeared to work and in 
December 1997, four years after the statutory deadline, EPA transmitted to 
Congress its CAA §112(n)(1)(B)-mandated report to Congress (“EPA Mercury 
Report”). That was followed up shortly after by the Utility Study in February of 
1998.132 
The 1998 Utility Study identified 67 of the 188 HAPs designated by 
Congress in the 1990 Amendments as potentially emitted by EGUs.133 Of those 67 
HAPs, 14 were identified as “priority” HAPs due to their health impacts, including 
mercury.134 While reportedly close to releasing the report that focused on EGU-
sourced mercury and its health impacts in early 1995, that report languished at EPA 
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 131. S. Con. Res. 28, 105th Cong. (1997) (“A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of 
Congress that the Administrator of the [EPA] should take immediate steps to abate emissions of 
mercury and release to Congress the study of mercury required under the Clean Air Act . . . . “). 
 132. See 1998 UTILITY STUDY, supra note 125. 
 133. Id. at ES-4. 
 134. Id. at ES-6. 
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in draft form until 1998, most likely due to pressure from not only the utility 
industry, but also from representatives of the seafood industry who were worried 
about public perception of mercury risks from fish.135 
What the 1997 EPA Mercury Report lacked in timeliness it made up for in 
scale; it consisted of eight volumes and included in-depth analyses of 
anthropogenic sourcing, fate and transport, human health and environmental 
exposure, and potential mercury control technologies with their attendant costs.136 
Reviewing the scientific literature, the report concluded that there was “a plausible 
link between mercury emissions from anthropogenic combustion and industrial 
sources and mercury concentrations in air, soil, water and sediments . . . and 
methylmercury concentrations in freshwater fish.”137 The 1997 EPA Mercury 
Report also concluded that EGUs had surpassed municipal waste combustors and 
medical waste incinerators as the largest “identifiable” anthropogenic sources of 
mercury emissions to the atmosphere; it estimated EGU mercury emissions at 
approximately 52 tons in 1994-1995, accounting for 33% of total anthropogenic 
emissions.138 
Both proponents and opponents of EGU mercury regulations drew on the 
Report, with the former arguing it showed action was needed to protect the 
vulnerable populations identified, and the latter claiming it showed that for most 
Americans methylmercury in fish was not a significant threat.139 In regards to the 
vulnerable populations identified in the Report, debates focused on both the limited 
and contradictory epidemiological data available, and the relative importance of 
EGU-sourced mercury as a contributor to methylmercury in fish.140 Faced with the 
potential for imminent and costly mercury control standards, members of Congress 
successfully pushed to have the Report’s health assumptions scrutinized by the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS), a tactic that had become a frequent means to 
 
 135. See Dieter Bradbury, Congressional Delegation Slow to Respond to Mercury Threat Sen. 
Olympia Snowe Initially Urged the EPA to Withhold a Controversial Report That Could Result in 
Stricter Pollution Limits, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD: THE MERCURY MENACE, Sept. 29, 1997, at A7 
(discussing the reasons why EPA withheld the report). 
 136. See id. (mentioning EPA report suggested solutions for cutting mercury in the environment). 
 137. 1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 29, Vol. I, at 3-20. 
 138. See 1997 EPA Mercury Report, supra note 29, Vol. II, at ES-4, ES-10, 4-2 tbl.4-2. 
 139. James Gerstenzang, EPA Report Raises new Concerns About Mercury; Environment: Study 
Sees Greater Risk of Toxic Substance Entering the Atmosphere, Food Chain, L.A. TIMES, DEC. 19, 
1997, at 37 (claiming that mercury from EGUs is a greater hazard than previously believed); Jim 
Nichols, EPA Calls for Mercury Watch Utilities, Miners Fear for Future of Coal-Fired Plants, PLAIN 
DEALER, June 15, 1998, at 1B (stating that EPA’s position against mercury from coal-fired EGUs is 
shaky as EPA’s assumptions about the health risks of mercury “are based on extrapolation, not direct 
testing”). 
 140. E.g, Regional Haze and Mercury Pollution: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air, 
Wetlands, Private Property &Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on Env’t &Pub. Works, 105th Cong. 30–
32, 38 (1998) (statement of Gary Myers, Professor of Neurology and Pediatrics, Rochester, New York) ( 
“The results of the Seychelles child development study so far . . . indicate no adverse developmental 
effects from prenatal methylmercury exposure in the range commonly achieved by consuming large 
amounts of fish.”); id. at 36 (statement of Leonard Levin, Program Manager, Air Toxics Health and Risk 
Assessment, Electric Power Research Institute) (“[Seychelles] findings, if they’re supported in later 
analyses, imply that a given mercury level in fish may be less of a threat to human health than formerly 
believed.”). 
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both delay environmental decisions as well as subject agency decisions to what 
some members of Congress perceived as a more scientifically conservative 
standard of review.141 The targets were the assumptions used by EPA as to what 
level of mercury level in fish constituted a health risk.142 
Congress therefore required EPA to contract with NAS to “perform a 
comprehensive review of mercury health research and prepare recommendations on 
the appropriate level for a mercury exposure reference dose [RfD].”143 If the NAS 
referral had been a tactic to forestall or thwart mercury regulation, however, it was 
not particularly successful. In July 2000, the NAS’s National Research Council 
(NRC) released a report that drew on more recent data from the Seychelles, Faroe, 
and New Zealand studies, examined the existing body of toxicological and 
physiological information, and concluded EPA’s RfD was appropriate.144 The 2000 
NRC Report stated that based on the RfD, “over 60,000 newborns annually might 
be at risk for adverse neurodevelopmental effects from in utero exposure to 
[methylmercury].”145 The results were stark; NRC concluded that mercury in fish 
“is likely to be sufficient to result in an increase in the number of children who 
have to struggle to keep up in school and who might require remedial classes or 
 
 141. JASANOFF, supra note 16, at 59 (“Risk-assessment guidelines . . . were generally characterized 
[by industry representatives] as science, suitable for resolution by accredited expert bodies like the 
National Academy of Sciences. Industrial groups were convinced that these technocratic organizations 
would reach conclusions that were scientifically more conservative. . . . “); Heinzerling & Steinzor Part 
I, supra note 10, at 10301 (“In the last few years, referral of regulatory controversies to NAS peer 
review panels has gone from being a useful tool in complex regulator decisionmaking to becoming a 
central tactic used to forestall or delay regulation of toxics.”); ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 17, at 
64 (“Most historians of science would say that the Academy has an intrinsic conservatism stemming 
from its dependence on the executive branch . . . Moreover, Academy reports are normally consensus 
reports . . . [t]he result is often a ‘least common denominator’ conclusion, with a text innocuous enough 
that everyone involved can agree.”). 
 142. In examining the potential health impacts of the organomercury forms accumulating in fish, the 
1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT used an RfD, or “[a]n estimate . . . of a daily exposure to the human 
population (including sensitive subgroups) that is likely to be without an appreciable risk of deleterious 
effects during a lifetime,” of .1 µg/kg/day, or one ten millionth of a gram per day. 1997 EPA MERCURY 
REPORT, supra note 29, Vol. I, at 0-2, 3-27 (RfD based on studies of Iraqi grain poisoning victims). 
RfDs are determined through an oftentimes-complicated process: after a toxic hazard is identified, 
“dose-response” assessments using epidemiological and/or animal experiments identify the highest level 
of exposure for which no observed adverse effect is seen. This dose is then multiplied by an “uncertainty 
factor” to account for scientific uncertainty (and occasionally a “modifying factor” derived through the 
evaluators’ professional judgment) in order to create the RfD, which can then start as the base from 
which to evaluate the health impacts of the toxic chemical on human populations. The less data 
available, the higher the uncertainty factor is set and therefore the lower the RfD. Somewhat 
paradoxically, even where additional research shows a substance is more toxic than originally believed, 
the RfD might go down because there is less need of uncertainty levels. See generally Michael L. 
Dourson et al., Uncertainties in the Reference Dose for Methylmercury, 22 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 677 
(2001). 
 143. H.R. REP. NO. 105-276, at 282 (1998). 
 144. See 2000 NRC REPORT, supra note 32, at 326–27. The NRC dose-response assessment resulted 
in a benchmark dose level of 12 ppm, as compared to EPA’s 11 ppm. 
 145. Id. at 325. 
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special education . . . . [T]he long-term goal needs to be a reduction in the 
concentrations of [methylmercury] in fish . . . . 146 
4. The 2000 Listing Rule: EPA Finally Regulates EGU-Sourced 
Mercury 
 
On December 20, 2000, faced with an incoming administration that was 
likely to be far less friendly to pollution control regulations, and armed with strong 
scientific support from the new NRC report, the promulgated the 2000 Listing 
Rule, holding that it was “appropriate and necessary” that EGUs be regulated under 
CAA Section 112(c).147 Citing the 1998 Utility Study, the Rule discussed multiple 
HAPs of concern being emitted from EGUs, but relied principally on EGU-sourced 
mercury to justify its determination, noting “there is a plausible link between 
methylmercury concentrations in fish and mercury emissions from [EGUs].”148 The 
2000 listing rule did not impose specific regulatory requirements, stating that EPA 
would later subcategorize EGU source categories and set emissions “floors” for 
those categories for mercury and the other HAPs.149 
5. Mercury Emissions Regulations in the 1990’s: Context and 
Conclusions 
While the 1990 Amendments dramatically reshaped air toxics regulations 
under CAA, EGU-sourced mercury and other HAPs escaped mandatory regulation 
pending further investigation. In 1992, a Democratic administration came to power, 
which many expected to be somewhat more amenable to regulation and more 
focused on the benefits of environmental regulations rather than simply the costs. 
However, President Clinton still employed a more pro-business, anti-regulatory-
cost rhetoric than many Democrats preferred, and in 1994, a conservative 
Republican majority captured both houses of Congress, and made removing or 
weakening environmental protection laws and regulations one of their primary 
goals through both substantive statutory changes as well as significantly reducing 
EPA’s budget for enforcement of environmental laws, particularly of CAA and the 
Clean Water Act.150 These political fights may have resulted in a level of caution at 
EPA that delayed release of the reports until late in President Clinton’s second 
 
 146. Id. at 9. So stark was the conclusion that even the power industry appeared to accept the panel’s 
conclusions, “shifting the debate over mercury regulation from if to how.” Andrew C. Revkin, Milestone 
Report on Mercury Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/12/us/m
ilestone-report-on-mercury-emissions.html. 
 147. 2000 Listing Rule, supra note 4, at 79,826. EPA would later note that the HAP reductions 
expected from acid rain controls set forth in the 1990 Amendments—the putative reason why EGU-
sourced contaminants were not designated HAPs at the time—had turned out lower than expected. See 
Proposed Supplemental Finding That it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate HAPs From Coal- and 
Oil-Fired EGUs, 80 Fed. Reg. 75,025, 75,036–37 (Dec. 1, 2015). 
 148. 2000 Listing Rule, supra note 4, at 79,830. 
 149. Id. An industry group quickly appealed the 2000 listing decision to the D.C. Circuit, but the 
case was dismissed on the grounds that HAP listings under 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(4) are not subject to 
review until emissions standards are set. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 01-1074, 2001 WL 
936363, (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2001) (per curiam). 
 150. See LAZARUS, supra note 77, at 125–40. 
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term, possibly aided by industry pressure, as might the agency’s realization that at 
the time it would be difficult to institute stringent mercury pollution controls.151 
Throughout the 1990s, the number of fish consumption advisories based on 
mercury levels increased, though for most of the decade regulations under CAA 
remained in stasis pending the outcome of the various statutorily-required reports 
on mercury and HAP. The 2000 Listing Rule, however, would lead to a far more 
active debate in the 2000s and beyond. 
D. Regulatory Battles and Atmospheric Ideologies: 2001-Present 
1. The Anti-Regulatory Redux: George W. Bush’s Pollution Policy 
Under CAA Section 112(c)(5), the 2000 Listing Rule required emissions 
standards for EGU-sourced mercury and other HAP be promulgated within two 
years. Shortly after the 2000 Listing Decision, however, George W. Bush was 
inaugurated. A former oil company executive (like his Vice-President, Dick 
Cheney), who ran on an explicitly anti-regulatory platform, his time in office saw 
attempted rollbacks of the fairly modest regulations issued by the Clinton-era EPA 
and significant efforts to substantially relax federal pollution control laws, 
particularly the CAA.152 The Bush administration had promised in its 2002 budget 
to “reform the current single-pollutant approach to regulating existing electric 
utility plants with a multi-pollutant approach, which would provide regulatory 
certainty to utilities, phase in reductions over a reasonable period, and make use of 
market-based incentives to further clean up the environment.”153 EPA justified 
multi-pollutant approaches on the grounds that many pollutants had common 
emissions sources, control technologies, and interacted with each other in a way 
that impacted exposure pathways and risks.154 A multi-pollutant approach was not a 
new one; that policy approach grew out of converging trends of technological 
advancements in emissions controls in the 1990s that could eliminate multiple 
contaminants, as well as growing scientific awareness that air pollutants interacted 
with each other in the atmosphere and human bodies in ways different than when 
by themselves.155 While environmentalists initially considered President Bush’s 
ascension to the presidency a potential environmental catastrophe in light of his 
anti-regulatory rhetoric, oil industry experience, and his pro-industry record as 
 
 151. See 1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 29, Vol. VIII, at 6-2 (“Given the relative low 
maturity level of these technologies being tested, commercial deployment is still several years away.”). 
 152. See EMILY COUSINS ET AL., NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, REWRITING THE RULES: THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION’S FIRST-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL RECORD (Special ed. 2005), https://www.nrdc.org/
sites/default/files/rr2005.pdf. 
 153. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, A BLUEPRINT FOR NEW BEGINNINGS: A RESPONSIBLE BUDGET 
FOR AMERICA’S PRIORITIES, 73–74 (2001), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2002-
BLUEPRINT/pdf/BUDGET-2002-BLUEPRINT.pdf. 
 154. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE MULTI-POLLUTANT REPORT: TECHNICAL CONCEPTS AND 
EXAMPLES 1-1 to 1-2 (2008), https://archive.epa.gov/airquality/aqmp/web/pdf/20080702_multipoll.pdf. 
 155. See generally Suzanne Shelley & Charles B. Sedman, Controlling Emissions from Fuel and 
Waste Combustion: Newer Methods Look to Remove Multiple Contaminants, 106 CHEMICAL 
ENGINEERING 82 (1999). 
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Governor of Texas,156 they did support a multi-pollutant approach in theory, 
particularly in light of EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman’s public 
acknowledgment that global warming was occurring and suggestion that carbon 
dioxide regulation would be included as a co-regulated pollutant.157 
a. The Clear Skies Plan and Mercury 
In February 2002, Bush released more details about his “multi-pollutant” 
approach with his “Clear Skies Initiative,” an approach to EGU emissions which 
sought to replace traditional emissions standards approaches with a multiple-
pollutant, cap-and-trade plan similar to the one that had been created to control acid 
rain in the early 1990s. As originally announced, the Initiative promised to reduce 
sulfur dioxide emissions by 73%, nitrogen oxide emissions by 67%, and mercury 
emissions by 69% by 2018.158 Environmental groups criticized the Initiative,159 
believing the bill did not go nearly far enough in reducing EGU emissions of SO2 
and NOX, and would be far less stringent than the 90% reduction in mercury 
emissions EPA had predicted under the post-2000 MACT standards. Introduced as 
identical bills in both the House and the Senate in July 2002, and reintroduced in 
substantively identical form in 2003 and 2005,160 the Clear Skies Act was the 
cornerstone of the Bush administration’s air pollution policy. 
The Clear Skies Plan and its proposed implementing legislation caused a 
massive backlash from the environmental community, and were fiercely opposed 
by Democratic members of Congress from the beginning, never making it out of 
committee.161 Though Republicans attempted to keep different versions of the 
Clear Skies Act alive over the next few years, after March 2005, it was effectively 
dead as a legislative proposal.162 During the fight over the Clear Skies Plan, 
Democrats introduced competing multi-pollutant bills that would have led to more 
significant reductions in mercury emissions, though none were successful either.163 
 
 156. See Jim Yardley, On the Record: Governor Bush and the Environment; Bush Approach to 
Pollution: Preference for Self-Policing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 1999), http://www.nytimes.co
m/1999/11/09/us/record-governor-bush-environment-bush-approach-pollution-preference-for-self.html. 
 157. Eric Pianin, EPA Mulls Limits for Power Plant Emissions; Environmentalists Laud White 
House Effort on Pollution, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2001, at A13. Shortly after, Whitman would be 
informed by President Bush that he had changed his mind, and that he had made a mistake calling CO2 a 
pollutant. John J. Fialka & Jeanne Cummings, How the President Changed His Mind on Carbon 
Dioxide, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2001, at A20. 
 158. Press Release, President Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives, THE WHITE 
HOUSE (Feb. 14, 2002, 2:05 PM), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02
/20020214-5.html.        
 159. See LAYZER, supra note 16, at 284. 
 160. Clear Skies Act of 2002, H.R. 5266, 107th Cong. (2002); Clear Skies Act of 2002, S. 2815, 
107th Cong. (2002); Clear Skies Act of 2003, H.R. 999, 108th Cong. (2003); Clear Skies Act of 2003, 
S. 485, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 161. See Rugh, supra note 10. 
 162. See Mary Curtius & Tom Hamburger, Bush’s Clear Skies Act Stalls in the Senate, L.A. TIMES 
(March 10, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/10/nation/na-skies10. 
 163. In the Senate, Vermont’s James Jeffords introduced the Clean Power Act, which sought to 
reduce EGU-sourced emissions of SO2, NOX, CO2, and mercury through a new CAA provision. Clean 
Power Act of 2001, S. 556, 107th Cong. (2001); Clean Power Act of 2003, S. 366, 108th Cong. (2003). 
His colleague Sen. Carper would later introduce the Clean Air Planning Act, which offered a more 
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b. A Change in Strategy: Instituting a Cap-and-Trade Plan Through the 
Rulemaking Process164 
Through 2004, even while President Bush was trying to convince 
Congress to accept his Clear Skies alternative, EPA still appeared to be moving (if 
slowly and begrudgingly) towards finally releasing MACT standards under Section 
112.165 The agency had convened a working group which met fourteen times 
between March 2001 and March 2003 to discuss the proposed Section 112 rule,166 
and the members of the group were charged specifically to determine an 
appropriate MACT standard for mercury.167 In December 2001, EPA had informed 
an industry group that the MACT standards under development could reduce EGU 
mercury emissions by 90% by 2008.168 
However, behind the scenes, Bush EPA appointees appeared to have been 
secretly working on a different objective.169 While the MACT group was meeting 
to develop the MACT standards, political appointees at EPA’s Office of Air and 
Radiation quietly worked to implement a version of the Clear Skies Act’s failed 
cap-and-trade scheme for mercury through EPA rulemaking. On April 1, 2003, a 
planned fifteenth meeting for the MACT group was cancelled and never 
rescheduled,170 though the head of EPA’s Air and Radiation Office assured 
 
stringent cap-and-trade program for mercury as well as SO2, NOX, and CO2. Clean Air Planning Act of 
2003, S. 843, 108th Cong. (2003); Clean Air Planning Act of 2007, S. 1177, 110th Cong. (2007). The 
Energy Information Agency conducted a comparative analysis of the three competing plans, finding 
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under the Clear Skies Plan. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SR/OIAF/2004-05, 
ANALYSIS OF S. 1844, THE CLEAR SKIES ACT OF 2003; S. 843, THE CLEAN AIR PLANNING ACT OF 2003; 
AND S. 366, THE CLEAN POWER ACT OF 2003 (2004). 
 164. For a comprehensive account of the circumstances that led up to the 2004 Proposed Rule, see 
Heinzerling & Steinzor Part I, supra note 10. 
 165. Heinzerling & Steinzor Part II, supra note 10, at 10488. 
 166. Proposed Nat’l Emission Standards for HAPs; and in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of 
Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: EGUs, 69 Fed. Reg. 4652, 4656 (Jan. 30, 2004) 
(to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 60, 63)) [hereinafter 2004 Proposed Clean Air Mercury Rule, or 2004 
Proposed CAMR]. 
 167. Heinzerling & Steinzor Part I, supra note 10, at 10306. 
 168. CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE & NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S 
PROPOSED AIR POLLUTION LEGISLATION: MORE MERCURY POLLUTION, HIGHER HEALTH RISKS, at *2, 
http://www.savethecleanairact.org/pdf/FS-S-131-Mercury.pdf. 
 169. The following year, the Natural Resources Defense Council would show that at an April 2001 
meeting the Edison Electric Institute, an influential industry group, a lobbyist assured energy sector 
representatives that the Bush administration would use EPA rulemaking to institute both criteria and 
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Before the S. Comm. On Env’t and Pub. Works, 109th Cong. 254-57 (2005) (transcript of speech by 
Quinn Shea, Senior Director for Environmental Activities, Edison Electric Institute). 
 170. Heinzerling & Steinzor Part II, supra note 10, at 10489; Tom Hamburger & Alan C. Miller, 
Mercury Emissions Rule Geared to Benefit Industry, Staffers Say, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2004), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/mar/16/nation/na-mercury16/3; Eric Pianin, EPA Led Mercury Policy 
Shift; Agency Scuttled Task Force That Advised Tough Approach, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2003, at A17. 
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suspicious members of Congress that while EPA advocated passage of the Clear 
Skies Act, it still would provide a MACT standard.171 
When EPA finally released its 2004 proposed “Clean Air Mercury Rule” 
(CAMR) to regulate EGU-sourced HAP, it did propose Section 112 MACT 
restrictions that EPA forecast would reduce mercury emissions by thirty-four tons 
in 2010 and thirty-one tons in 2020–standards far weaker than what the working 
group had anticipated.172 Because no existing EGUs had installed mercury-specific 
emissions reduction equipment, EPA had significant freedom in determining the 
MACT floors for both new and existing sources, and took advantage of it by 
subcategorizing EGUs by coal type, then using a combination of emissions tests, 
mercury composition of the coal used, and a statistical corrective that assumed each 
plant was emitting mercury at its peak level.173 The proposed standards for new 
sources were based on the statutorily required “best-controlled similar source” 
which EPA determined were PM and flue gas control measures, with emissions 
standards calculated through a similar process as determined the MACT floor for 
existing units.174 
As surprising as the extremely weak MACT standards were to observers 
(including the MACT working group), even more surprising were the non-MACT-
based cap-and-trade alternatives that EPA proposed. The first proposed cap-and-
trade rule was based on a provision in Section 112(n)(1)(A) that required EPA to 
report “alternative control strategies for emissions” in the 1998 Utility Study. EPA 
had followed this requirement in the report, describing in detail a number of 
alternate control strategies, including technological controls like coal cleaning and 
gasification, as well as energy conservation and management practices, but did not 
include cap-and-trade as a control strategy for mercury.175 In the 2004 proposed 
CAMR, EPA argued that this reporting obligation also gave it the authority to 
 
 171. The Clear Skies Initiative: A Multipollutant Approach to the Clean Air Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 95 
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 172. 2004 Proposed CAMR, supra note 166, at 4706. The proposed rule only applied to EGUs of 
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mercury, the Proposed CAMR also proposed regulating nickel emissions from oil-fired utilities, but 
none of the other HAPs discussed in the 2000 Listing Decision. Id. at 4689. 
 173. Id. at 4668–82. For a detailed critique of the means by which EPA calculated the MACT floor, 
see MICHAEL AUCOTT & LEO KORN, N.J. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROT., EPA’S PROPOSED MACT FLOOR 
STANDARDS FOR MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM COAL-FIRED UTILITY UNITS (2004), http://www.nj.gov
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passage. See Waxman, supra note 112, at 1777. While Rep. Waxman notes that in §112(c)(1) Congress 
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to section [111], [the New Source], and part C, [prevention of significant deterioration provisions],” the 
actual language of the provision only requires EPA do this to “the extent practicable,” and explicitly 
states that “nothing in [the sentence cited by Rep. Waxman] limits the Administrator’s authority to 
establish subcategories under this section, as appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1) (2012). 
 174. 2004 Proposed CAMR, supra note 166, at 4677–93. 
 175. See 1998 UTILITY STUDY, supra note 125, 13-1 to 13-47(“Alternative Control Strategies for 
Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions Reductions”). 
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implement one of the alternative control strategies, apparently including one that it 
never reported on in the Utility Study.176 
The proposed rule also offered a parallel cap-and-trade plan under Section 
111(a)(1), a provision that, while not explicitly allowing such a program, does not 
explicitly foreclose on one.177 However, before implementing such a cap-and-trade 
plan under Section 111, EPA would have to somehow delist mercury as a HAP, 
since pollutants cannot be regulated under both Section 111 and Section 112. Both 
the Section 111(d) and Section 112(n)(1)(A) cap-and-trade alternatives would cap 
mercury emissions at an undisclosed amount in 2010 determined by the co-benefits 
of SO2 and NOX reductions projected from another proposed rule published that 
day, the proposed Clean Air Interstate Rule.178 The caps were based on the 
proposed Section 112 MACT floors, but the cap-and-trade system would allow not 
only banking of unused allowances, but provided a “safety valve” provision that 
capped allowance costs at $2,187.50 per ounce, making it potentially less 
expensive for some EGUs to simply buy allowances instead of even attempting to 
limit emissions.179 EPA followed the 2004 Proposed CAMR with a Notice of Data 
Availability (NODA), proposing a process for quantifying the mercury deposition 
and bioaccumulation impact of the proposed rule. 
c. The Backlash Against the Proposed CAMR 
While environmentalists have frequently invoked the accusation that 
industry is often allowed to write the regulations, for the 2004 Proposed CAMR 
this was not hyperbole; the proposed rule contained numerous legal arguments that 
mirrored almost exactly memoranda submitted by attorney lobbyists from the law 
firm at which both the head of EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation and his principle 
deputy had worked before joining EPA—who argued for a cap-and-trade system.180 
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179 See Proposed Nat’l Emission Standards for HAPs; and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of 
Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources, EGUs: Notice of Data Availability, 69 Fed. Reg. 
69,864–78 (Dec. 1, 2004). 
 180. Eric Pianin, Proposed Mercury Rules Bear Industry Mark, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2004), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/01/31/proposed-mercury-rules-bear-industry-
mark/028e1379-0026-4bcb-b7ce-192bbae7b4c6/?utm_term=.686a49ccc080        (“A side-by-side 
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The cap-and-trade plan and the circumstances surrounding its development evoked 
quick opposition from internal EPA staff, environmental groups, many states, 
scientific experts on the mercury issue, and members of Congress.181 MACT 
working group members and EPA staff reported that technical experts at the agency 
were cut out of the process.182 Members of the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee were suspicious of the process resulting in the 2004 Proposed 
CAMR, and requested analyses of the proposed rule from EPA’s Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG), and from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
both of which released reports highly critical of the Proposed CAMR and the 
process by which it was created.183 
EPA OIG conducted an internal investigation and concluded that the 
proposed Section 112 MACT standards had been arrived at through a pretextual 
calculation; rather than determine the best controlled 12% of existing sources 
required by Section 112(d)(3), EPA senior management had simply instructed staff 
to take as a given that a MACT-based standard was to result in 2010 emissions of 
thirty-four tons, and then develop a MACT methodology that would result in that 
number.184 They did this through modifying various assumptions, and modifying 
variables and re-running models until the latter projected the thirty-four ton 
number.185 
 
comparison of one of the three proposed rules and the memorandums prepared by Latham & 
Watkins . . . shows that at least a dozen paragraphs were lifted, sometimes verbatim, from the industry 
suggestions.”); Juliet Eilperin, EPA Wording Found to Mirror Industry’s, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2004), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39749-2004Sep21.html; Matt Fleischer-Black, 
Mercury Man; Did the EPA’s Jeffrey Holmstead Take a Cue from Latham Lobbyists?, AM. LAW. (Aug. 
1, 2005), https://www.iatp.org/news/mercury-man-did-the-epas-jeffrey-holmstead-take-a-cue-from-
latham-lobbyists. Holmstead would later claim that he had been given the language from another agency 
with its origins unmarked. Fleischer-Black, supra. EPA formally responded to the criticism through the 
rulemaking docket, though very briefly. EMISSIONS STANDARDS DIV, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
OAR-2002-0056-6215, RESPONSE TO SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED CLEAN AIR 
MERCURY RULE 10-4 (2005), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/utility/sec_111_respcom_oar-2002-0056-
6206.pdf (“EPA is aware of the concern expressed by the commenters and has responded to the 
Congressional inquiries. The material in question was provided to EPA through the Clean Air Act 
Advisory Committee working group process established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(FACA) and, thus, we do not feel that its use was inappropriate.”). 
 181. See COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE AND SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE: PROPOSED NAT’L EMISSION 
STANDARDS FOR HAPS; AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PROPOSED STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR NEW 
AND EXISTING STATIONARY SOURCES,OAR-2002-0056 (June 28, 2004) (comments of state attorney 
generals and environmental officials opposing cap-and-trade proposal), 
http://www.4cleanair.org/Oldmembers/members/committee/airtoxics/stateAGsmercurycomments.pdf; 
Jennifer 8. Lee, White House Minimized the Risks of Mercury in Proposed Rules, Scientists Say, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 7, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/07/us/white-house-minimized-the-risks-of-
mercury-in-proposed-rules-scientists-say.html. 
 182. Hamburger & Miller, supra note 170. 
 183. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-252 , CLEAN AIR ACT: OBSERVATIONS ON 
EPA’S COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ITS MERCURY CONTROL OPTIONS (2005) [hereinafter 2005 GAO 
REPORT], http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/245489.pdf; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, 2005-P-00003, ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF MERCURY EMISSIONS NEEDED BEFORE EPA 
FINALIZES RULES FOR COAL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2005) [hereinafter 2005 EPA OIG REPORT], 
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/91018FYT.PDF?Dockey=91018FYT.PDF. 
 184. 2005 EPA OIG REPORT, supra note 184, at 13. 
 185. Id. at 13–15. 
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Furthermore, the OIG concluded that the true basis for the thirty-four tons 
– the co-benefits projected under the Clean Air Interstate Rule – did not comply 
with the MACT requirements of CAA. As to the cap-and-trade plan, the OIG 
criticized its lack of stringency and implicitly questioned the veracity of the 
drafters.186 The OIG also found that staff had been pressured to base the benefits 
analysis of the proposed rule on the public comments solicited through the NODA 
(many of which came from utilities), rather than on the scientific literature.187 
Finally, the OIG noted that several documents it had requested had not 
been provided by EPA, including statistical analyses for MACT model runs, inter-
agency communications, and information as to how the Latham & Watkins 
memoranda language got into the proposed rule.188 In its response to the OIG’s 
draft report, EPA simply disputed several of the factual assertions—including that 
it had started with the thirty-four-ton emissions goal and manipulated MACT 
calculations to meet it—but did not address the report’s recommendations.189 
The GAO also investigated the 2004 Proposed Rule, specifically the cost-
benefit analyses used to compare the proposed cap-and-trade plan with the MACT 
rule, and found such analyses significantly lacking. While EPA examined the costs 
of the MACT rule by itself, it analyzed both the costs and benefits of the cap-and-
trade plan in the context of the CAIR rule, making comparison between the two 
impossible. Perhaps most critically—and inexplicably—EPA’s cost-benefit 
analysis of the two options failed to quantify the actual primary health benefits of 
mercury emissions reductions.190 Instead, EPA calculated the secondary health 
benefits accruing from the reduction of fine particles, such as decreases in 
respiratory diseases and heart attacks.191 As did the OIG, the GAO also faulted 
EPA for its lack of transparency in developing the proposed rule.192 
d. The Clear Skies Act Reborn: Reversing the 2000 Listing Rule and 
Implementing Cap-and-Trade Under CAMR 
Largely ignoring the criticism from congressional members, 
environmentalists, EPA’s own inspector general, and the GAO, EPA ultimately 
promulgated the Section 111(d)-based cap-and-trade plan in their final Clean Air 
Mercury Rule (“CAMR”),193 followed by the 2005 Delisting Rule.194 EPA 
characterized the new cap-and-trade plan as “the best method for encouraging the 
continued development of [emissions control] technologies.”195 The 2010 cap 
 
 186. See id. at 15. 
 187. Id. at 33. 
 188. Id. at 9, 41. 
 189. Id. at 49. 
 190. 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 184, at 12. 
 191. Id. at 12 & n.15. 
 192. Id. at 4. 
 193. Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: EGUs, 70 Fed. Reg. 
28,606 (May 18, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, 75) [hereinafter 2005 CAMR]. 
 194. 2005 Delisting Rule, supra note 4, at 15,994 (“We are taking this action because we now 
believe that the December 2000 finding lacked foundation and because recent information demonstrates 
that it is not appropriate or necessary to regulate [EGUs] under section 112.”). 
 195. 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,615. 
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under the 2005 CAMR was even higher than EPA OIG had anticipated, at thirty-
eight tons, with a 15 tpy cap coming into effect in 2018.196 According to EPA, the 
caps would reduce mercury emissions by “up to 70%,” significantly less than the 
2000 Regulatory Finding proposed.197 Direct health benefits of the mercury 
reductions from the 2005 CAMR were projected at a modest 0.2 to 3 million 
dollars a year by 2020.198 As had been promised in the 2004 Proposed Rule, the 
final Phase I cap would not require additional mercury-specific mitigation 
technologies, as the 38 tpy figure was the estimated amount of mercury reduction 
as a co-benefit from already-existing SO2 and NOX rules.199 As had been 
contemplated in the 2004 Proposed CAMR, EGUs would be able to bank 
allowances for future use, but the “safety valve” provision was removed.200 The 
cap-and-trade system would be implemented by the states pursuant to State 
Implementation Plans subject to review by EPA, with states failing to participate 
still required to reduce emissions below their cap.201 
Under the 2004 Proposed CAMR, the cap for the cap-and-trade plan 
would have been based on concurrently offered CAA Section 112 new source 
MACT standards, which would equal the “best controlled similar source.”202 
However, purportedly responding to commenters who argued that even that was 
too strict for Section 111 emissions standards—which require explicit 
consideration of cost—EPA revised the cap upwards.203 Those caps were not based 
on mercury-specific control technologies, but rather on controls that would be 
installed to control PM2.5 and SO2, as EPA argued that stringent mercury-specific 
control technologies could not be installed and operated on a national scale by the 
2018 final cap deadline.204 Even given those limitations the mercury emissions 
 
 196. Id. at 28,606; see also Jana B. Milford & Alison Pienciak, After the Clean Air Mercury Rule: 
Prospects for Reducing Mercury Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants, 43 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 2669, 
2669 (2009). 
 197. OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-
05-003, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL CLEAN AIR MERCURY RULE 3-3 (2005), 
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/91011BYT.PDF?Dockey=91011BYT.PDF. 
 198. See 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,642, 28,643 tbl.3. These costs were based on “avoided 
IQ decrements in potentially prenatally exposed children . . . and the benefits of reducing directly 
emitted [particulate matter].” Id. at 28,641. Details about the modeling of these benefits were provided 
in the separate Regulatory Impact Assessment. 
 199. Id. at 28,617–18. 
 200. Id. at 28,629–30. 
 201. Id. at 28,607. 
 202. Id. at 28,615. 
 203. Id. Compare 2004 Proposed CAMR, supra note 166, at 4690, with 2005 CAMR, supra note 
194, at 28,615. Depending on source subcategory, the final standards were less stringent by factors of 
approximately 2 to 5. 
 204. 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,615–16. While the 1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT had 
concluded that reliably controlling mercury emissions from coal-fired EGUs was “several years away,” 
1997 EPA MERCURY REPORT, supra note 29, Vol. VIII, at 6-2, in the years since that report was 
published a joint DOE-industry pilot program had made significant gains by the time of the 2005 
CAMR. See generally John H. Pavlish et al., Status Review of Mercury Control Options for Coal-Fired 
Power Plants, 82 FUEL PROCESSING TECH. 89 (2003). 
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released from the “best controlled similar sources” upon which the caps were based 
also assumed particularly high levels of mercury in source coal.205 
Two weeks after publishing the 2005 CAMR, EPA issued the 2005 
Delisting Rule removing EGU-sourced mercury as a Section 112 HAP.206 The 
conventional HAP delisting process under §112(c)(9) would have required EPA 
determine that no EGU—or EGU category—would release mercury emissions 
above a level adequate to protect public health and preclude adverse environmental 
effects.207 Even the Bush-era EPA seemed unwilling to make such a clearly 
implausible determination, so instead the 2005 Delisting Rule simply concluded 
that the delisting requirements of Section 112(c)(9) need not be met, that the 
“appropriate and necessary” standard gave EPA significant discretion in how to 
treat EGU-sourced HAP, and thus “nothing precludes [EPA] from revising [the] 
appropriate and necessary finding” based on initial error or new information.208 
EPA’s position was that the 2000 Listing Decision was fundamentally unwarranted 
at the time it was made, and it offered a lengthy argument that EGU-sourced 
mercury did not pose a significant health hazard, particularly after the mercury 
reduction co-benefits of recent regulation were taken into account.209 Such 
marginal health benefits, argued the 2005 Delisting Rule, have been substantially 
outweighed by the costs of compliance were mercury to be regulated under Section 
112.210 
 
 205. See 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,615; see also JIM EDDINGER, COMBUSTION GROUP, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM ON STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MERCURY TEST DATA TO 
DETERMINE BDT FOR MERCURY EMISSIONS 3 (March 15, 2005), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/utility/
nsps_doc_oar-2002-0056-6192.pdf (“Using the highest [mercury] fuel content ensures that the 
developed NSPS limit are achievable by a unit located anywhere in the United States.”). 
 206. Requests for reconsideration of both the 2005 Delisting Rule and CAMR were filed with EPA, 
but were denied in a subsequent rule that only made minor substantive changes to State mercury 
allocations and some of the section 111(d) new source standards. See Revision of December 2000 CAA 
Section 112(n) Finding Regarding EGUs; and Standards of Performance for New and Existing EGUs: 
Reconsideration, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,388, 33,389 (June 9, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 207. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 208. 2005 Delisting Rule, supra note 4, at 16,002. 
 209. Those other rules included new NSPS standards for NOX emitted from utility and industrial 
boilers, and the requirement that 22 states and the District of Columbia revise their state implementation 
plans to mitigate interstate transport of ozone. 2005 Delisting Rule, supra note 4, at 16,004. The 
argument that remaining mercury emissions after those rules would have minimal health impacts was 
supported by EPA deposition modeling described in the rule. Id. at 16,015–21. EPA based its 
conclusions on modeling runs using CMAQ, its general-purpose atmospheric processes model, when 
applied to mercury the CMAQ had at that point shown a tendency to predict smaller aqueous mercury 
concentrations than other mercury models commonly used by scientists and governmental agencies. See 
Alexey Ryaboshapko et al., Comparison of Mercury Chemistry Models, 36 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 3881, 
3894–95 (2002). A 2005 peer review panel that evaluated the CMAQ model noted that the CMAQ 
results for the 2005 CAMR were not particularly robust. PRAVEEN AMAR ET AL., FINAL REPORT: 
SECOND PEER REVIEW OF THE CMAQ MODEL 13 (2005) https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2017-05/documents/final_report_second_peer_review_of_the_cmaq_model_july_2005
.pdf. Generally, the results of even good faith modeling can show dramatically different results based on 
model parameters and assumptions. 
 210. 2005 Delisting Rule, supra note 4, at 16,000–01, 16,021–22. EPA justified the decision through 
a number of assumptions, including that only freshwater fish should be analyzed, that only women of 
childbearing age are at risk, that research showing high levels of consumption by certain subpopulations 
should not be relied upon, and that only utility-attributable mercury should be measured. Id. 
162 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 58 
e. New Jersey v. EPA 
EPA’s new mercury strategy was met with intense criticism; members of 
Congress introduced joint resolutions to disapprove the rule under the 
Congressional Review Act, which if successful would have forced EPA to issue a 
MACT-based rule, though the resolution did not pass.211 Dissatisfied with the lack 
of stringency, many states later issued their own EGU-sourced mercury regulations 
that went well beyond the 2005 rule.212 Predictably, a number of environmental 
groups and states appealed the 2005 Rule to the D.C. Circuit Court.213 On February 
8, 2008, the D.C. Circuit vacated the 2005 Rule in New Jersey v. EPA, finding 
EPA’s delisting decision violated the plain text and structure of Section 112 
because EPA did not make the necessary findings required to delist HAP under 
Section 112(c)(9).214 EPA raised different statutory construction and deference 
arguments but the Court rejected them, holding that Congress had intentionally 
removed significant discretion from the HAP listing process—and that included the 
EGU-sourced mercury process—precisely because it considered EPA too reluctant 
to list HAPs.215 
Because the court concluded that the 2005 Delisting Rule was invalid, 
EGU-sourced HAP including mercury remained regulated under Section 112, 
precluding them from regulation under Section 111 and resulting in the Court 
vacating both the 2005 Delisting Rule and the 2005 CAMR. The New Jersey 
decision came out shortly before President Bush was to leave office, and future 
EGU mercury emissions regulations would wait for his successor. One of the last 
actions the administration took on EGU-sourced mercury emissions was cancelling 
DOE field tests of mercury emissions reduction technology— once they started to 
show low-cost reduction of 90 percent or more of emissions was possible.216 Bills 
 
 211. S.J. Res. 20, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 
(2012). Of course, overturning the 2005 Delisting Rule would have likely lead to further battles on the 
suitability of the MACT standards already developed by EPA. See JAMES E. MCCARTHY & RICHARD S. 
BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22207, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF EPA’S MERCURY RULE 2 
(2005), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20050725_RS22207_64e65541441ca2d9d4e1a075110
d9d8ccad482f7.pdf. 
 212. JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33535, MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM 
ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS: STATES ARE SETTING STRICTER LIMITS 2 (2007), https://www.
everycrsreport.com/files/20070222_RL33535_9490786af904352a3618fa139135a3471dab06fb.pdf. The 
Congressional Research Service would also analyze the 2005 CAMR rule and come to a similar 
conclusion as EPA and 2005 GAO reports. See DANA A. SHEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL32744, MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS: A REVIEW OF EPA ANALYSIS 
AND MACT DETERMINATION (2005), https://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/RL32744.pdf. 
 213. New Jersey, v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. dismissed, 555 U.S. 1162 (2009), and 
cert. denied sub nom., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. New Jersey, 555 U.S. 1169 (2009). 
 214. Id. at 583. 
 215. Id. at 582–83. 
 216. See 2009 GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 6 (“[W]hile a number of short-term tests achieved 
mercury reductions in excess of 90 percent, the amount of sorbent injection that achieved the reductions 
was often decreased during long-term tests to determine the minimum cost of achieving, on average, 70 
percent mercury reductions. Beginning in 2007—near the end of the research program—DOE field tests 
aimed to achieve reductions of 90 percent or greater mercury at low costs. However, DOE reported that 
federal funding for the DOE tests was eliminated before the final phase of planned tests was 
completed.”). 
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were again introduced in Congress to force EPA to implement strict EGU-sourced 
mercury emissions limits, though none passed.217 
2. 2008-2016: The Obama Administration and Air Pollution Control 
President Obama’s entry into the White House signaled a change in EPA’s 
approach to pollution control, particularly regarding atmospheric pollution. His 
environmental record as a state legislator in Illinois and the U.S. Senate had been 
mixed;218 however, in light of his pro-environmental campaign rhetoric, and the 
fact that his immediate predecessor compiled what had been widely considered one 
of the worst environmental records, if not the worst, in U.S. history, 
environmentalists were optimistic.219 Immediately after taking office he quickly 
moved to halt the flurry of “midnight regulations” the Bush EPA had attempted to 
push through the regulatory process at the end of that administration, though with 
mixed success.220 
 
 217. E.g., Mercury Emissions Control Act, S. 2643, 110th Cong. § 3 (2008) (requiring EPA to 
promulgate regulations that reduce mercury from new and existing EGUs by “not less than 90 percent”); 
Mercury Emissions Reduction Act, H.R. 1087, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (amending section 112 to require 
EPA to promulgate EGU-sourced emissions standards within one year); Healthy Air and Clean Water 
Act, H.R. 3989, 110th Cong. § 702 (2007) (setting mercury emissions limits for EGUs at .6 lbs per 
trillion Btu). 
 218. Ken Dilanian, Obama’s Record on Coal Support, USA Today( July 18, 2008), 
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GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jan/16/greenpolitics-georgebush 
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century of progress on the environment . . . “ “[His] administration has introduced this pervasive rot into 
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Signals Rebirth of US Environmental Policy, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2008, 9:42 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/nov/05/climatechange-carbonemissions (President of 
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destructive environmental policies.”); see COUSINS ET AL., supra note 152, at iv (“Over the course of the 
first term, [the Bush} administration led the most thorough and destructive campaign against America’s 
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 220. Gale Lea Rubrecht, President Obama Halts Midnight Regulations, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T 47, 47–49 (2009); see also Elizabeth Kolbert, Midnight Hour, NEW YORKER (Nov. 24, 2008), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/11/24/midnight-hour; R. Jeffrey Smith, A Last Push to 
Deregulate, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/10/30/AR2008103004749.html; Bryan Walsh, George W. Bush’s Last 
Environmental Stand, TIME (Nov. 5, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,
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a. The Obama EPA’s Mercury and Air Toxics Rule 
President Obama had previously indicated his willingness to take action 
on mercury. While a Senator, he introduced two pieces of legislation aimed at 
reducing environmental mercury emissions,221 and had been a co-sponsor of the 
unsuccessful resolution to nullify the 2005 Delisting Rule. Shortly after he won the 
2008 presidential election, several non-profit groups brought suit in D.C. District 
Court to compel EPA to create EGU-sourced mercury MACT standards, and EPA 
entered into a consent decree requiring promulgation of MACT standards in 2011, 
with final regulations to follow in six months.222 
The proposed regulations, published on May 3, 2011, would impose 
stringent controls on EGU-sourced HAP, including mercury, under Section 112.223 
Under the proposed standards, mercury reductions would be reduced from a 
baseline projected 29 tpy to 6 tpy by 2015, with additional reductions in the other 
HAP identified in the Utility Study.224 The proposed rule drew significant attention; 
EPA received a record breaking more than 900,000 public comments, far more than 
any similar proposed regulation.225 Many, particularly from individual members of 
the public, strongly supported stringent regulation of EGU-sourced mercury, 
though the EGU industry and its allies protested EPA’s scientific and legal 
rationales for both the “confirmation” of the 2000 Listing Rule and the proposed 
standards.226 
On February 16, 2012, EPA issued the final 2012 MATS Rule, slightly 
modified from the proposed Rule but instituting similar emissions standards that 
would reduce EGU-sourced mercury emissions from a newly projected 27 tpy 
down to 7 tpy.227 In terms of mercury emissions standards, the 2012 MATS Rule 
used a more stringent analysis to determine the MACT floor than had the 2004 
 
 221. Missing Mercury in Manufacturing Monitoring and Mitigation Act, S. 3631, 109th Cong. 
(2006) (amending the Toxic Substances Control Act to phase out the use of mercury in chlorine and 
caustic soda manufacturing); Mercury Export Ban Act of 2008, S. 906, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted) 
(amending the Toxic Substances Control Act to prohibit federal agencies from selling or conveying 
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 222. See Am. Nurses Ass’n v. Jackson, No. 1:08-cv-02198, 2010 WL 1506913, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Apr. 
15, 2010). State and industry actors sought to prevent the Consent Decree, but did not prevail. See Am. 
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Further proceedings were mooted when EPA promulgated of emissions standards in December of 2011. 
 223. Nat’l Emission Standards for HAPs From Coal- and Oil-Fired EGUs, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,976 
(proposed May 3, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 60, 63) [hereinafter 2011 Proposed Mercury and 
Air Toxics Standards or 2011 Proposed MATS Rule]. 
 224. Id. at 25,073 tbl.21. The 2011 Proposed MATS was also projected to reduce hydrogen chloride 
by 68,000 tpy and through HAP control co-benefits, SO2 by an additional 2.1 million tpy, NOX by 
100,000 tpy, PM2.5 by 83,200 tpy, and CO2 by 24.2 million tpy. Id. 
 225. 2012 MATS Rule, supra note 4, at 9306. 
 226. EPA aggregated, summarized, and responded to many of these comments in the final rule. See 
id. 
 227. Id. at 9424 tbl.7. Projected emissions reductions had changed for other HAPs as well, as did 
projections of baseline HAP emissions absent the 2012 MATS Rule. Compare id., with 2011 Proposed 
MATS, supra note 224, at 25,073 tbl.21. 
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Proposed CAMR or 2005 CAMR.228 While EPA conducted a thorough analysis of 
the costs of the 2012 MATS Rule, concluding that they were outweighed by the 
benefits, it also concluded that it did not need to account for costs before regulating 
EGU-sourced HAPs.229 Likely foreseeing legal and political pushback from the 
EGU industry, EPA also conducted extensive new modeling of mercury risk,230 and 
relied heavily on its independent Scientific Advisory Board (“SAB”) to review its 
methodologies and assumptions.231 Significant changes were made to the scientific 
technical and evaluation, but even after the suggested modifications were made, the 
models still showed that, contrary to the conclusions reached by EPA when 
justifying the 2005 Delisting Rule, EGU-sourced mercury posed a discrete hazard 
to human health.232 EPA used the same deposition model to support the listing 
decision in the 2012 MATS Rule as it had for the 2005 Delisting Rule, but 
incorporated more data and used different modeling assumptions and higher spatial 
resolution.233 
b. Michigan v. EPA 
The Final Rule was appealed in White Stallion Energy Center, L.L.C. v. 
EPA, this time by impacted companies, industry and labor groups, and states, while 
environmental groups, other industry groups and states intervened in support of the 
Rule.234 The central argument by petitioners was that EPA improperly decided that 
it was “necessary” and “appropriate” to list EGU-sourced mercury without 
considering the costs, as it was implausible that Congress would want no attention 
paid to cost considerations.235 The D.C. Circuit court rejected that argument, siding 
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note 194, at 9367 tbl.3, with 2005 CAMR, supra note 194, at 28,615. 
 229. See 2012 MATS Rule, supra note 4, at 9425-32. Many of the stated benefits were based on co-
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 231. 2012 MATS Rule, supra note 4, at 9312–18 (describing consultation with SAB). 
 232. Sensitivity analyses examine how changing model variables—in this case for example, only 
looking at high-mercury-deposition watersheds, or changing consumption patterns—altered the overall 
population risk values derived by the model, and found that such changes did not significantly reduce 
that risk. See id. at 9315–16. 
 233. See 2011 Revised Technical Support Document, supra note 231, at 48 (2011) (describing the 
differences between the modeling for the 2005 Delisting Rule and the 2012 MATS Rule). 
 234. 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 235. Id.at 1236. 
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with EPA and intervenors and holding that under the plain language of CAA 
Section 112(n)(1), EPA was ordered to list EGU-sourced mercury as a HAP if it 
“f[ound] such regulation appropriate and necessary after considering the results of 
the [EPA and NIEHS studies],”236 and thus the decision to list was therefore 
predicated solely on the determination of whether EGU-sourced mercury was a 
public health hazard. Any cost considerations would then be incorporated when 
actually setting MACT emissions limits.237 Industry and state actors opposing the 
rule appealed to the Supreme Court on the cost consideration issue under the 
MATS Rule.238 
As the Supreme Court noted in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, it 
had previously “refused to find implicit in ambiguous sections of the CAA an 
authorization to consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly 
granted.”239 On its face, the Court seemed to be addressing a similar situation when 
reviewing EPA’s “appropriate and necessary” determination: the CAA, particularly 
after the 1990 Amendments, explicitly requires EPA to consider costs before 
making regulation decisions in a number of provisions.240 In the amended Section 
112 provisions at issue, Congress had not only failed to expressly require EPA to 
consider costs when making the “appropriate and necessary” determination, but 
had mandated that it only make such a determination after considering the results 
of the 1998 Utility Study, the statutory requirement of which was purely a public 
health analysis.241 
The legislative history of the 1990 Amendments to Section 112 also 
strongly suggested that Section 112’s sole focus on health survived the 1990 
Amendments, with EPA being required to add a substance to the HAP list generally 
“upon a showing . . . that emissions . . . are known to cause or may reasonably be 
anticipated to cause adverse effects to human health or adverse environmental 
effects.”242 Indeed, the provision that excepted EGU-sourced HAP from automatic 
regulation was added in conference and then only because Congress seemed 
reluctant to regulate where the separate acid rain provisions of the 1990 
Amendments might remedy the problem.243 For HAPs from all other major sources 
not likely to be impacted by the acid rain provisions, EPA was only to consider 
costs in the emissions standards stage of regulation, and even then the MACT floor 
 
 236. Id. at 1239 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012)). 
 237. See id. at 1238–41. 
 238. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014) (mem) (granting petition for writ of certiorari limited 
to the question of “[w]hether the [EPA] unreasonably refused to consider cost in determining whether it 
is appropriate to regulate [HAPs] emitted by [EGUs].”). 
 239. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 467 (2001) (citing Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 
427 U.S. 246, 257 & n.5 (1976)). 
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 241. Id. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
 242. Id. § 7412(b)(3)(B). 
 243. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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required a certain minimum emissions standards, notwithstanding the cost.244 
Furthermore, giving the ambiguity of the “appropriate and necessary” 
determination, EPA would seem to have significant discretion under Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. to determine just what that 
meant.245 
However, rejecting the applicability of both American Trucking Ass’ns 
and Chevron, the Court ruled 5-4 in favor of petitioners, holding that it “strayed far 
beyond [Chevron’s] bounds” when it made its “appropriate and necessary” listing 
decision without paying attention to cost considerations.246 Arguing that such a 
“capacious[]” phrase required that “all the relevant factors” be considered, the 
opinion reasoned that for its listing decision to be “appropriate,” at least some 
attention to cost must be paid; otherwise, the potential could arise that “billions in 
economic costs” might be incurred “in return for a few dollars in health or 
environmental benefits.”247 Conceding that other Section 112 listing decisions were 
based on the threat to human health or the environment, the Michigan majority 
characterized the EGU-specific “appropriate and necessary” section as Congress 
enacting different and “unique” requirements to be met before regulating EGU-
sourced HAP.248 The four justices dissenting argued that EPA had, in fact, paid 
significant attention to costs throughout the entire process, and would do so again, 
faulting the majority for unduly focusing on the one initial stage of the regulatory 
decision where cost was not required under the statute.249 
3.  The Trump Administration and the Future of the Mercury and Air 
Toxics Rule 
While many observers had assumed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
denial of a stay on the 2012 MATS Rule that the final rule would stand, Trump’s 
election and his appointment of Scott Pruitt—who had himself litigated against the 
2012 MATS Rule as Attorney General of Oklahoma—has called that into question. 
A number of parties appealed the 2016 Supplemental Finding on various grounds, 
arguing inter alia that the cost analyses done by EPA did not comply with 
Michigan or CAA, and impermissibly counted the co-benefits of reducing non-
HAP pollutants.250 
Though Obama’s EPA had opposed the appeal along with a number of 
state and non-governmental organization intervenors, the Trump EPA would later 
 
 244. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2)–(3). 
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move to continue the oral arguments on petitioners’ motion, because “[i]n light of 
the recent change in Administration . . . the appropriate officials [need] adequate 
time to fully review the Supplemental Finding.”251 EPA further notes that those 
officials may “reconsider the rule or some part of it.”252 The D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals granted EPA’s motion to continue, requiring the agency to report on the 
status of its review every 90 days, but not giving any specific deadline to complete 
that review.253 In the meantime, the 2012 MATS Rule seems to remain in place. 
EPA left unclear how exactly it would “reconsider the rule or some part of 
it” in light of the requirements of section112. Instead, EPA vaguely references 
“[a]gencies[‘] . . . inherent authority to reconsider past decisions and to revise, 
replace or repeal a decision to the extent permitted by law. . . . “254 The primary 
difficulty in “reconsider[ing]” the rule, of course, is as the D.C. Circuit Court noted 
in New Jersey v. EPA, it is far more difficult for EPA to add a pollutant to the HAP 
list—CAA Section 112(b)(3)(C) forbids removing EGU-sourced mercury as a HAP 
absent a finding that “emissions, ambient concentrations, bioaccumulation or 
deposition of the substance may not reasonably be anticipated to cause any adverse 
effects to the human health or adverse environmental effects.”255 In the case of 
mercury, this would be impossible—there is no dispute that bioaccumulation can 
cause adverse effects to human health and the environment.256 Still, as the 2005 
Delisting Decision and 2005 CAMR demonstrated, even regulatory decisions that 
appear on their face to be invalid can delay stringent regulations for years while 
they work their way through the rulemaking and court systems. 
Additionally, in terms of real-world effects, even were the 2016 
Supplemental Finding to be successfully withdrawn (or, withdrawn for a number of 
years while the inevitable litigation worked its way through the court system), the 
vast majority of EGUs have already complied with the 2012 MATS Rule’s 
emissions requirements or, in the case of older plants, have shut down. 
Furthermore, coal-fired EGUs are increasingly disadvantaged economically in 
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comparison to natural gas and renewable energy. Removing the rule might, 
however, allow plants to save money by both allowing them to turn off control 
technologies as well as not be subject to reporting requirements or enforcement 
actions. In any event, the Trump EPA’s position likely signals that the multi-decade 
EGU-sourced mercury emissions debates will in fact go on longer. 
4. The Evolving Mercury Emissions Discourse, 2000-2016: Context and 
Conclusions 
Discerning the why of the second Bush administration’s attempt to head 
off stringent mercury regulations is not difficult; he, his vice-president, and many 
of his appointees were veterans of the energy industry who adhered to a fiercely 
anti-regulatory ideology that saw environmental regulations dangerous not just to 
the immediate economy but capitalism, and American economic pre-eminence 
itself. The specific how, though, requires a deeper inquiry. It is important to 
consider that, historically direct challenges to environmental regulations often 
faced congressional, public, and judicial resistance in a way that could be both 
politically damaging and result in legislative action that removed significant agency 
discretion over environmental policy domains. For example, the HAP provisions of 
the 1990 Amendments wherein anti-regulatory actors both inside and outside 
government relied increasingly on “low profile” challenges that attempted to 
reframe and redirect regulatory discourse in a way that sought to hide goals in 
arcane rulemaking processes and technical language.257 Indeed, this strategy switch 
can be prominently seen with the second Bush Administration’s Clean Skies Plan; 
defeated in Congress and facing significant public backlash, its architects simply 
attempted to implement it under the CAA’s rulemaking process. 
Both procedural and technical discursive practices were leveraged to 
frame, analyze, and regulate mercury emissions in a way that would minimize 
industry burdens. On a procedural level President Bush’s appointees shut out 
agency and independent scientists, incorporated industry-provided materials 
ranging from modeling results to actual industry-drafted language, and drafted both 
the rules and the technical documentation alleged to support them in lengthy and 
arcane language – the 2005 CAMR and 2005 Delisting Rule made up a combined 
and densely technical 135 pages of the Federal Register, while the Regulatory 
Impact Analysis document EPA produced to support those rules made up 570 
pages. The architects of the 2005 CAMR complemented those tactics by framing 
their approach in a way that emphasized uncertainty and downplayed risks; for 
example, the 2005 CAMR attempted to undermine EPA’s health assumptions as to 
the level at which mercury in fish is likely to cause adverse health effects by 
downplaying the reliability of the RfD.258 As presented to the public, the overall 
projected emissions of the Clear Skies Act generally were framed as beneficial to 
human health, though they only appeared so when compared to a mercury 
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emissions baseline which involved no additional mercury emissions regulations 
whatsoever.259 
Perhaps the most unusual aspect about the 2005 CAMR process was that 
even after many of these tactics were exposed not only by the OIG and GAO 
reports as well as by significant media coverage, and even after EPA’s own 
employees warned that the CAMR was likely unlawful under CAA,260 the CAMR’s 
architects simply proceeded to implement it. Considering the substantial public 
record of irregularities in the rulemaking process, as well as the almost legally 
indefensible 2005 Delisting Decision, it seems possible that they expected the 2005 
CAMR to not survive judicial scrutiny. But even delay served the EGU industry 
sector, allowing them to put off significant costs and profit from highly-polluting 
EGUs that were operating well past their expected lifespan.261 
Why did the Bush administration face so little political or electoral fallout 
from its intense anti-environmental record?262 Several explanations offer 
themselves. Increasing political polarization and partisan animosity is one; in 1970 
environmental regulations were supported by large proportions of both the public 
and politicians; for example, CAA passed without a single nay vote in the Senate, 
and with a single representative voting against it in the House.263 However, the 
electoral politics have shown widening between those supporting environmental 
protection measures and those opposing them.264 Among the general public there is 
still significant support for environmental protection measures, but the past two 
decades have also seen significant political polarization generally; even if a 
conservative and/or Republican voter had supported stronger EGU-sourced 
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mercury emissions generally, they might be less likely to vote based on that single 
issue in light of general political self-identification.265 
When the Obama administration took power, it brought its own discursive 
framing to bear. Representing a sharp break from the anti-regulatory ideology of 
his predecessor, President Obama pursued the most robust emissions control policy 
since the beginning of the CAA, attempting to place significant controls on not 
only mercury and other EGU-sourced HAP, but also greenhouse gas emissions 
through the rulemaking process with the Clean Power Plan. To head off potential 
attacks on the scientific conclusions reached by EPA in enacting the 2012 MATS 
Rule, the Obama-era EPA relied heavily on the SAB to vet its research, and 
addressed each of the recommendations and requests brought by the SAB in 
response.266 Where the Bush-era 2005 CAMR often read like a work of legal 
advocacy, the Obama-era 2012 MATS Rule more frequently read like a scientific 
article or report, with frequent references to articles in scientific journals that 
supported the point under discussion.267 Like the Bush-era EPA, EPA under Obama 
framed not only the legal and technical aspects of their program in a way that 
counseled taking its chosen policy approach, but also framed opposing viewpoints 
by summarizing and framing public comments opposing stringent mercury 
regulations in ways that made them seem less credible or as arguing for patently 
unlawful or unreasonable interpretations of CAA.268 Though it is early in the 
Trump administration, his EPA has already signaled a major rollback of 
environmental regulations.269 The fact that petitioners in Murray Energy Corp. v. 
Envt’l Prot. Agency have attacked, inter alia, the economic modeling assumptions 
underlying the 2016 Supplemental Finding—and the fact that current EPA 
Administrator Scott Pruitt represented one of the petitioners in the Murray Energy 
Corp. case—indicates that EPA’s review may involve the same kind of approach to 
modeling assumptions used by the Bush-era EPA to justify the 2005 Delisting Rule 
and the 2005 CAMR. 
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III. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
If the first (1970-1989) and second (1990-2000) eras of CAA-based 
mercury regulatory decisions were defined by inaction and delay, the third (2001-
2017) has seen vigorous battles played out in Congress, EPA rulemaking process, 
and the federal courts over how to regulate EGU-sourced mercury. From the 
CAA’s creation until the present, a surgent anti-regulatory movement has emerged 
and environmental issues have become increasingly polarized, with an executive 
branch frequently controlled by politicians either unable or unwilling to fully 
implement CAA provisions, particularly regarding HAP. As overt attempts to 
weaken or delay CAA provisions proved less effective, politicians and 
policymakers interested in reducing environmental regulatory burdens on business 
instead turned to lower-profile mechanisms to implement industry-friendly rules. 
No process shows this evolution in such sharp relief as President Bush’s Clear 
Skies Plan and the controversial implementation of its mercury provisions as the 
2005 CAMR. Framed as a means to reduce the dangers posed by, inter alia, EGU-
sourced mercury, the 2005 CAMR created a regulatory mechanism that essentially 
placed no mercury reduction requirements on EGUs for several years. 
The tactics used to delay actual mercury emissions reductions 
requirements included modifying scientific and technical assumptions to increase 
projected costs while reducing projected benefits, all within a rhetorical framing 
that strove to appear objective and “scientific.” One particularly common strategy 
has been afforded by—and likely partially the cause of—an increase in the length 
of regulations. The 1973 rule regulating mercury emissions from chlor-alkali plants 
made up 31 pages, including pages discussing beryllium and asbestos, with most of 
the Rule setting forth technical and procedural processes to ensure compliance.270 
The 2005 CAMR, on the other hand, was more than three times as long, and relied 
on even longer technical analyses filed separately on the docket.271 
While environmentalists ultimately appeared to have been victorious in 
the regulation of mercury emissions by EGUs, the recent announcement by the 
Trump EPA has cast the 2012 MATS Rule in doubt again. Furthermore, even if 
EPA decides not to withdraw or alter the rule,272 the history of the rule’s passage 
shows a costly victory. In the context of the 40-year history of Section 112, the 
EGU industry has been the real winner. While it has been the primary source of 
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mercury emissions since at least the 1990s, it has avoided mercury regulations 
through appeals to scientific uncertainty and purportedly unreasonably high costs 
of control, aided by a well-organized ideological movement against environmental 
regulations that has been highly effective not only in Republican administrations 
but also Democratic ones.273 As shown above, while anti-regulatory actors were 
unable to substantially weaken the CAA itself or delay stringent mercury 
regulations indefinitely, by prolonging the debate they were able to let EGUs reap 
those financial benefits for decades. 
The health costs resulting from this inaction may be substantial. From 
1993 until 2011, the percentage of total river miles and lake acres subject to 
chemical contamination advisories—with mercury being the most common 
contaminant—increased from less than 5% to over 35% for the former, and from 
less than 10% to over 40% for the latter.274 The comprehensive technical analysis 
produced by EPA for the 2012 MATS Rule, revised in response to peer-review by 
SAB, suggests that vulnerable groups especially may be exposed to dangerous 
levels purely due to EGU emissions alone, even at the decreased mercury levels 
then found in the environment.275 In the context of CAA’s history, then, the delay 
in regulating EGU-sourced mercury may have negatively impacted generations of 
children, particularly in vulnerable communities where freshwater fish 
consumption may be particularly high. 
Furthermore, at this point many EGUs have already installed control 
technologies (or in the case of older plants, closed down) in response to MATS or 
state-level restrictions, and thus have already complied with the 2012 MATS Rule. 
While it is likely too soon to determine whether the new mercury control measures 
are effective in reducing mercury in waterbodies from which fish are taken, initial 
data suggests that they may already be effective in reducing localized mercury 
pollution near EGUs that have installed control technologies.276 Furthermore, the 
costs of such controls have not proven especially excessive, and the sorbent 
injection controls themselves may be even more efficacious than previously 
thought by industry actors.277 
What policy recommendations can be gleaned from the EGU-sourced 
mercury debate? For one thing, it provides an almost textbook example of the 
fundamental difficulties of the modern environmental regulatory apparatus; striking 
the appropriate balance between giving agencies like EPA sufficient discretion to 
regulate pollution in a flexible manner, but not giving them so much discretion that 
agency actors hostile to environmental regulation use that flexibility to weaken or 
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delay regulations protective towards human health.278 But as the history described 
above demonstrates, even where EPA has not been given discretion, it will often 
take it – as in the case of the 2005 CAMR. The history of the EGU-sourced 
mercury debate also provides a clear example of the shift from overt challenge or 
resistance to CAA requirements to a more covert approach that uses a pro-
environmental narrative framing and control of technical analyses to put into place 
regulations that benefit industry as much as possible. 
What is the best way to regulate either EGU-sourced mercury or other 
toxics emissions in the future? In the case of mercury and a number of other 
pollutants, the current multi-pollutant approach seems more effective than a single-
pollutant one, allowing multiple layers of pollution mitigation regulations that can 
reduce a potentially expansive array of pollutants.279 For mercury specifically, 
increased government funding for scientific research into areas that are still 
uncertain, particularly atmospheric cycling and population-level health effects, 
would help, as would implementing a more comprehensive national mercury 
deposition monitoring network.280 
Dealing with the technical and scientific dimensions of air pollution 
control generally may end up being less difficult to resolve than clashes of 
ideology, considering that the scientific and technical consensus that mercury 
posed a danger to the American public, and that EGU emissions were the largest 
anthropogenic source in the United States.281 How can environmental regulations 
be effectively implemented when EPA is controlled by those ideologically opposed 
to such regulations at a fundamental level, who have developed sophisticated 
procedural and discursive strategies they can leverage when they have political 
control of EPA? While environmental advocates have successfully headed off 
many such attacks in the courts and before legislative bodies, anti-regulatory 
interests often hold the advantage because they can frequently achieve their goal by 
simply delaying regulations as long as possible. And even though the regulatory 
debate over EGU-sourced HAP emissions has on more than one occasion seemed 
to have reached a denouement, changes in administration continuously place it 
back in question. 
Perhaps future regulatory debates would be served best by a more explicit 
engagement in ideological disputes, moving away from a technical or scientific 
framing of uncertainty towards debates over values: in the face of uncertainty, how 
much risk is the public willing to suffer—and who should bear that burden of 
uncertainty? Although most of the public has been consistently pro-environmental 
regulation, they tend not to make voting choices based on environmental beliefs.282 
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The early 1970s, however, saw a massive public outcry that led to the CAA and 
other federal environmental statutes, so it is at least possible that this pro-
environmental fervor could recur, or at least the public could move towards a point 
where politicians again feel the need to follow along, if only for their own political 
careers.283 However, the CAA generally may be a victim of its own success; despite 
the critique above in regards to EGU-sourced mercury regulations (or the lack 
thereof), in many other ways it has largely been successful, improving the air 
quality immensely over the past several decades, if not always to the extent hope 
for when it first went into effect.284 That success may help explain the lack of 
political consequences for politicians who take an environmentally anti-regulatory 
stance in the face of a public that overall tends to favor environmental regulations 
by large margins.285 Even when the public expressed support for strong mercury 
emission regulations as with the 2005 CAMR, the executive branch seemed 
disinclined to listen to them.286 
Over the past decades, environmental policy analysts and other social 
scientists have worked on increasing public understanding of, and participation in, 
environmental policy decisions.287 Furthermore, the increasing risk of dire—and 
very visible—consequences of climate change may also help spur increased public 
interest in environmental laws and regulations, and if those consequences are as 
severe as many scientists project, such involvement will be critical. Increasing 
public interest in environmental protection could help push presidential 
administrations into taking environmental protection more seriously, and help 
fulfill the lofty goals of the environmental regulatory regime envisioned in the 
Earth Day era. 
Ancient alchemists saw mercury as an element of change and flux; 
ideologically-charged actors in the modern federal rulemaking process have 
similarly seen the law regarding mercury subject to their own transmutation, able to 
be transformed into different manifestations as ideological actors gain control of 
the regulatory crucible. Allowing greater public involvement in that alchemy may 
ensure that what comes out of the crucible is consistent with what the public 
wants—and deserves. 
 
 283. See LAZARUS, supra note 77, at 75–77. 
 284. Concentrations of each NAAQS pollutant in the atmosphere of the United States has shown a 
steady downward trend over the past few decades, with particularly significant decreases in the smog 
precursors SO2 and NOX. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Progress Cleaning the Air and Improving 
People’s Health, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/progress-cleaning-air-and-improving-
peoples-health (last visited Nov. 12, 2017). Hazardous air pollutant emissions are somewhat harder to 
track due in part to their variability, though emissions for many (but not all) HAPs have been similarly 
reduced over time. See generally McCarthy et al., Background Concentrations of 18 Air Toxics for 
North America, 56 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 3 (2006). 
 285. Polls show that roughly three-quarter of the public agrees that the country should “do whatever 
it takes to protect the environment.” Monica Anderson, For Earth Day, Here’s How Americans View 
Environmental Issues, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/04/20/for-earth-day-heres-how-americans-view-environmental-issues/. 
 286. See discussion supra Section II.D.1. 
 287. See, e.g., WILLIAM ASCHER ET AL., KNOWLEDGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: RE-
IMAGINING THE BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE AND POLITICS (2010); David Guston, Democratizing Science: 
Ends, Means, Outcomes, in THE RIGHTFUL PLACE OF SCIENCE: POLITICS 39–47 (G. Pascal Zachary ed., 
2013). 
